On 28 September, Moldova faces one of the most consequential elections in its modern history—and Russia is spending $180 million, more than 1% of the country’s GDP, to manipulate the outcome.

While the vote formally determines the composition of the 101-seat parliament, in reality, it will decide whether the country remains on its pro-European trajectory or slides back into Moscow’s sphere of influence.

Just this May, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos said Moldova could be “decoupled” from Ukraine in the accession process, possibly completing it by 2027. Fast forward four months, and pro-Russian parties have made a resurgence in Moldova’s Sunday elections, potentially torpedoing the country’s path toward the EU altogether.

Officials in Chișinău have already warned about unprecedented Russian interference, including the injection of hundreds of millions of euros into pro-Kremlin political allies, sophisticated disinformation campaigns, and the direct use of local proxies to tilt the outcome.

Russia’s unprecedented interference operation

Bloomberg recently revealed Russian planning documents that outline strategies to block Moldova’s EU accession and eventually remove Sandu from power. According to analysts, Russia is set to spend as much as $180 million on manipulating the outcome.

Unlike past campaigns dominated by cash bribes, Moscow now increasingly relies on cryptocurrencies and digital ecosystems.

Telegram channels and TikTok influencers play a central role in disseminating anti-European messaging, making it more challenging for authorities to track and prosecute.

For example, a recent BBC investigation found that the so-called “Shor network” — a system of bots and channels operating primarily in Telegram that has recruited local citizens to promote personalized content adapted to local contexts in favor of Russian-backed candidates — is still functioning and has massive impact on information coverage in the digital space.

According to the BBC, the network is connected with the Kremlin organization Eurasia, which aims to strengthen Russian influence in post-Soviet countries.

Beyond promoting political messages favorable to Russian proxies, participants in the so-called “Shor network” also spread disinformation aligned with Russia’s broader propaganda narrative in Moldova.

• One recent example was a fabricated claim that Moldovan troops were fighting alongside Ukraine in the war — a statement swiftly debunked by Moldovan authorities.
• Another case involved a viral fake portraying Ukrainian and Moldovan soldiers as LEGO figures, suggesting joint participation in the conflict.

Beyond this election’s influencer campaign, Russia has set its eyes on upending Moldova’s EU path for years—from a plot to topple Chisinau’s government directed from London to electoral interference to pervasive pro-Russian protests. An international consortium of journalists concluded in 2023 that Russia was planning a Belarus-like takeover of Moldova by 2030.

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Moldova’s electoral landscape on Sunday

The ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) of President Maia Sandu enters the race weakened compared to its landslide victories in 2020 and 2021. Polls show a drop from over 50% support in 2021 to around 25% this year, reflecting frustration with economic stagnation and slow anti-corruption reforms.

Nevertheless, PAS remains the strongest pro-European force.

Its main challenger is the newly formed Patriotic Bloc, an alliance of former presidents Igor Dodon and Vladimir Voronin alongside ex-premier Vasile Tarlev, who openly campaign on restoring closer ties with Moscow.

Until Friday, ex-leader of the Gagauzia region Irina Vlah was part of this pro-Russian bloc; however, her party’s participation has been cancelled by the CEC at the eleventh hour.

Moscow’s campaign to “toxicize” Ukraine

One of the central pillars of Moscow’s interference is an effort to make Ukraine politically toxic in the eyes of Moldovans—to portray Kyiv not as a partner but as a source of danger, instability, and foreign meddling.

Irina Vlah, the former governor of Gagauzia, continues to echo pro-Russian talking points, posing with Putin’s portrait in the background while claiming Moldova “does not need tanks or radars but peace with Russia.”

Dodon, meanwhile, has accused Ukraine of dragging Moldova into war and blamed the EU for “dictatorship under the banner of Euro-democracy.” Such rhetoric taps into Soviet-era nostalgia and existing divisions: surveys show that up to 35% of Moldovans justified Russia’s invasion of Ukraine based on Kremlin narratives.

Russia has drawn lessons from earlier elections and adjusted its methods.

This time, it is not relying primarily on Russian bloggers, pro-Kremlin youth organizations, or outside consultants. Rather only buying voters or sponsoring overt propaganda, Moscow is now training local Moldovans to create and spread propaganda content themselves, leaked documents show.

This “toxicization” is a tactical move: by stoking fear that closer ties with Kyiv or Brussels will bring war, economic pain, or cultural marginalization, Moscow aims to shift voters away from pro-European parties and toward candidates who promise stability through rapprochement with Russia.

Russia’s fear campaign worked in Georgia before

We’ve seen a similar strategy work before. In Georgia’s October 2024 elections, the ruling Georgian Dream party deployed nearly identical tactics. They ran campaign materials featuring Ukrainian war destruction — bombed cities, cemeteries of Ukrainian soldiers, and destroyed theaters — alongside images of peaceful Georgian cities.

The message was clear: vote for the opposition and suffer Ukraine’s fate, or choose Georgian Dream for “peace.”

Georgian Dream branded the opposition as part of a “global war party” trying to open a “second front” alongside Ukraine. Despite 80% of Georgians supporting EU membership, the fear campaign proved effective. The party exploited trauma from Russia’s 2008 invasion, which left 20% of Georgian territory under occupation.

In the end, Georgian Dream claimed victory with 54.8% of the vote, though international observers documented widespread irregularities and Georgia’s president called it a “Russian special operation.”

The stakes for Ukraine and Europe

However, in terms of outcomes for Ukraine and Europe, a victory by pro-Russian forces in Moldova could prove especially dangerous. In the worst-case scenario, Moldova risks becoming a “second Belarus” — a new launchpad for Russia on NATO’s border.

Such a shift would directly undermine Ukraine’s European ambitions, particularly given Moldova’s vulnerabilities: an unstable energy system heavily tied to Russia and the continued presence of Russian troops in occupied Transnistria.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy underscored this danger in his speech at the UN General Assembly, warning that Europe cannot afford to “lose Moldova” the way it has already lost Belarus and risks losing Georgia.

Yet scenarios remain open, and several possible outcomes are still at stake: a PAS majority, fragile pro-European coalitions, or a chaotic stalemate marked by accusations of fraud and potential street protests organized by pro-Russian political actors.

Even if pro-European forces prevail, nearly half the electorate continues to look toward Moscow, ensuring that the Kremlin will not abandon its attempts, always having a “plan B,” as historical experience may confirm.

A frontline in Russia’s war on European democracy

Ultimately, Moldova’s 2025 elections are not a local affair. They represent another frontline in Russia’s broader war on Europe — a conflict waged with missiles and drones, but also with subtler weapons: disinformation seeded through Telegram channels, crypto-financed vote-buying, and political proxies disguised as “patriotic” voices.

The current Moldova campaign exploits real social fault lines:

• nostalgia for the Soviet past
• linguistic and regional divides, such as in Gagauzia
• economic frustrations,

turning them into vectors for anti-Ukrainian sentiment.

For US and European policymakers, the danger is twofold: a successful toxicization campaign weakens Moldova’s democratic resilience while eroding public support for Kyiv when it most needs European solidarity.

The stakes extend far beyond Chișinău: if Moscow succeeds in hijacking Moldova’s political future, it would:

• open a new corridor of instability on NATO’s border
• threaten Romania directly, and embolden the Kremlin to replicate the same hybrid playbook elsewhere in Europe.
• threaten Romania directly, and embolden the Kremlin to replicate the same hybrid playbook elsewhere in Europe.

Moldova’s ballot box has become part of the battlefield, and its outcome will test whether Europe can withstand this latest front in Russia’s war against democracy itself.