The Moscow generals who planned a “three-day” victory. The nuclear bombers that threatened Alaska for decades. The Wagner mercenaries who carved up African nations like personal fiefdoms — all neutralized by a country the world still sees as David fighting Goliath.
In just three years, Ukraine’s shadow warriors have rewritten the playbook of 21st-century espionage. They’ve assassinated Moscow’s top brass in their own capital, sabotaged Russia’s strategic bomber fleet with drones hidden in delivery trucks, and turned Putin’s African empire into a hunting ground — without a single Western spy officer leaving their desk.
As the West debates red lines and escalation risks, Ukraine’s spies are doing what no NATO agency dared: hunting Russian war criminals across three continents, from Moscow’s suburbs to Mali’s deserts — the very territories where Russia projected power unopposed for years.
Russia’s failed blitzkrieg birthed something far more dangerous than Ukrainian resistance — Ukrainian revenge. Putin’s quick war fantasy created a long-term horror: adversaries who follow no playbook but their own, with the owl now hunting the bear in its own den.
When David learned to fight dirty
Since 2022, Ukraine’s army has rapidly grown into one of the most inventive forces of the 21st century. As former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken quipped in 2023, Russia now fields “the second-strongest army in Ukraine” — a nod to how Ukrainian defenders have outsmarted what was once seen as a global military giant.
Yet, while Ukraine’s conventional forces make headlines, it’s the country’s intelligence services – especially the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) — that are quietly waging a global shadow war against Russia. Many of Ukraine’s boldest missions bear HUR’s fingerprints: from assassinations deep inside Russia to sabotage operations across Africa and Syria, Ukraine’s military intelligence has become one of the world’s most active — and feared — covert forces.
Now, Ukraine’s domestic security agency, the SBU, has shown up too, reshaping the future of warfare. On 1 June, after 18 months of planning, the SBU neutralized 34% of Russia’s nuclear-capable long-range bombers in a single operation.
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Dubbed “Spider Web,” the operation used 117 smuggled drones hidden in cargo trucks to strike five Russian airbases — some as far as 4,000 kilometers (2,485 miles) from Ukraine. The attack damaged or destroyed at least 13 strategic bombers, with Ukrainian estimates putting Russia’s losses at $7 billion.
In effect, Ukraine also did the United States a favor by striking the Tu-95 bombers — aircraft that have loomed as a nuclear threat to the US, especially near Alaska, for decades.
However, after what may be one of the most daring operations to rewrite the modern intelligence playbook, the race between HUR and the SBU is only heating up — and Moscow has every reason to fear what comes next.
The secret squad that crosses every red line
HUR’s reach now extends far beyond Ukraine’s borders, reflecting a doctrine forged through years of war with Russia and close cooperation with Western partners like the CIA and MI6.
“If you’re asking about Mossad as being famous [for]… eliminating enemies of their state, then we were doing it and we will be doing it,” said HUR chief, General Kyrylo Budanov. “We don’t need to create anything because it already exists.”
Israel’s Mossad has long been considered the gold standard in espionage and sabotage. That image faltered after its failure to prevent the 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks — but Israel quickly reasserted its reputation with a dramatic retaliation.
However, in September 2024, it made a brutal comeback with a headline-grabbing retaliation known as the “pager attack,” when explosives hidden in pagers and walkie-talkies were slipped to Hezbollah fighters and remotely detonated, killing dozens and injuring thousands more.
Ukraine, it seems, was taking notes. In February 2025, its intelligence services reportedly pulled off an echo of the pager attack: FPV drone goggles rigged with explosives were funneled to Russian units by fake donors posing as pro-Kremlin volunteers. When Russian drone operators opened the gear — it blew up in their hands.
“Ukraine’s ability to carry out an operation akin to the pager attack in Lebanon hinges on a robust and evolving intelligence service capable of complex global operations,” said Treston Wheat, chief geopolitical officer at Insight Forward and adjunct professor at Georgetown University.
Russia, meanwhile, was waging its own shadow campaign. In July 2024, it was suspected of sending parcel bombs across Europe, hiding incendiary devices in packages disguised as sex toys and fake cosmetics — a covert operation revealed months later by a Reuters investigation.
Yet, in the world of modern spycraft, it’s Ukraine that’s increasingly setting the pace. While Ukraine remains tight-lipped about its role in targeted assassinations, the precision and success of its recent operations speak volumes.
As a leading Russia analyst Mark Galeotti put it, the Kremlin is “well aware of HUR’s capabilities,” adding that Russian security agencies “treat it with considerable professional respect — even if equal dislike.”
Why Putin’s generals can’t sleep safely in Moscow
Andriy Cherniak of Ukraine’s military intelligence has made the stakes clear: anyone attacking Ukraine “is being watched.” Working hand-in-hand with the SBU, Ukraine’s spies have hunted down Russian war criminals and collaborators — even deep inside Moscow. In recent months, Kyiv has eliminated several Russian generals, with the Kremlin’s security agencies seemingly powerless to stop the growing reach of Kyiv’s covert war.
“They’ve been effective in terms of tactical outcomes, many of the missions have succeeded, including high-profile assassinations beyond Ukraine’s borders,” said Ukraine’s MP Oleksandra Ustinova, claiming that hunting down war criminals offers a powerful morale boost for Ukrainians.
Beyond revenge, these strikes serve a larger purpose: exposing the cracks in Russia’s security and political system, shaking confidence in its military leadership, and sending a message to the Kremlin itself. As Ustinova explains, military victories help reshape the political landscape — making it harder for Russia to sustain its campaign — the strategic logic behind Ukraine’s covert war.
“They’ve also shown the West that Ukraine’s capabilities go far beyond what we’ve traditionally been credited with,” Ustinova adds. “Even if they deliver smaller-scale successes, they still play a vital role in the broader campaign.”
Kyiv also believes it has shattered a long-standing Western fear: that any Ukrainian strike inside Russia — even in Moscow — would trigger massive escalation.
“These assassinations help demonstrate that,” Ustinova said, adding that the West seems far more afraid of what Ukraine could do to Russia if finally allowed to fight without limits.
How the CIA trained Russia’s most dangerous enemy
Ukraine’s rise as an intelligence powerhouse didn’t happen overnight — and it didn’t happen alone. After Russia launched its war in 2014, both the SBU and HUR — riddled with Russian infiltration, abandoned by fleeing operatives, and crippled by lost documents and shattered capabilities — were left in disarray and in urgent need of rebuilding.
The CIA saw it as a rare chance to rebuild a key ally against Russian aggression — but remained wary of the SBU, burdened by its Soviet legacy, a track record of corruption, and deep entanglement in economic crimes. While the CIA did invest in the SBU, including the creation of a new spy unit called the Fifth Directorate, it was HUR — Ukraine’s foreign-facing intelligence agency — that emerged as the biggest beneficiary of Western support.
In 2015–2016, under then-HUR chief Valerii Kondratiuk, Kyiv quietly began laying the groundwork for covert warfare, anticipating the day Russia would escalate to full-scale invasion. Soon after, the CIA funneled millions into training and equipping Ukraine’s intelligence officers. The goal was bigger than short-term support, seeking to transform Ukraine’s post-Soviet spy services into a modern, proactive force capable of striking deep behind enemy lines.
According to a former US diplomat stationed in Kyiv, Kondratiuk took significant personal risks to forge the partnership, likely handing over intelligence he wasn’t officially authorized to disclose. The gamble paid off: soon, the US began receiving sensitive data it hadn’t seen in decades.
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With US help, Ukraine built a network of secret forward bases near the Russian border — launchpads for sabotage, electronic warfare, and deep-penetration missions. The true scope of CIA support remains shrouded in secrecy: much of the partnership is classified, and the boldest operations likely unfolded far from public eye.
However, one glimpse into that shadow war came in August 2016. With Russian helicopters deployed in occupied Crimea, HUR special forces crossed enemy lines on a sabotage raid. A firefight erupted with Russian security agents. According to HUR, its agents killed Colonel Roman Kameniev — one of the top commanders of Russia’s special service (FSB) in Crimea — and Sergeant Semen Sychov, injuring others before exfiltrating.
The incident was so sensitive it sent shockwaves through capitals. Then-President Petro Poroshenko cut short a foreign trip, while US President Barack Obama considered shutting down Ukraine’s covert operations program entirely. Joe Biden, then Vice President, warned Ukraine’s president that “it cannot come close to happening again,” while Putin threatened to “not let such things slide by.”
That fear of Russian escalation has haunted US policy ever since, with Biden administration officials often paralyzed by fears of crossing Kremlin “red lines.” However, Kyiv has taken matters into its own hands — crossing Moscow’s so-called red lines again and again, and proving the Kremlin’s threats are more bark than bite.
The owl that haunts Putin’s nightmares
That firefight in Crimea would go on to shape more than just tactics — it forged the identity of Ukraine’s modern intelligence services. The mission, carried out by operatives from Ukraine’s Budanov’s unit, ended with the death of a Russian Spetsnaz commander who was also the son of a general. In the aftermath, the unit, already known for its audacity, adopted a new symbol: an owl with a sword piercing the heart of Russia.
The owl was chosen not only as a symbol of wisdom, but because it is the natural predator of bats — the emblem of Russia’s special forces, commonly known as Spetsnaz. It was also a deliberate counter to the Spetsnaz motto “Above us only stars.” It was also a bold answer to the Spetsnaz motto, “Above us only stars.” HUR’s quiet reply, etched in Latin: Sapiens dominabitur astris — Only the wise rule the stars. The Kremlin tried to smear the emblem as “fascist” and “extremist” — a sure sign it hit where it hurt.
The emblem was seemingly born from that very raid. Budanov reportedly kept live owls at their base, and the symbol was intended as a message to the Spetsnaz: we see in the dark, and we strike without warning. The image now sits behind Budanov’s desk, an enduring nod to the roots of HUR’s rise and to sticking it to the Russians. Budanov has also been the target of 10 Russian assassination attempts.
The assassins who saved democracy
By 2021, Ukraine’s intelligence operatives were not only trained for war – they were carrying out global missions. During the fall of Kabul, HUR executed a high-risk evacuation operation, rescuing some 700 people over six flights, including Ukrainian nationals and foreign allies. Ukrainian soldiers escorted convoys through Taliban-controlled streets to the airport, often on foot and under threat in Afghanistan.
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, HUR’s elite “Shaman Battalion” helped stop Kyiv from falling. The unit played a crucial role in the battle for Hostomel Airport, a key target Russia hoped to seize quickly to land troops just outside the capital. While they held the line there, other HUR teams sabotaged Russian convoys and supply routes, disrupting the advance toward Kyiv.
Later that year, the battalion carried out one of the war’s most daring missions — in the besieged city of Mariupol. As Russian forces surrounded the Azovstal steel plant, where hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers were trapped, HUR organized a series of helicopter raids behind enemy lines. Over the course of seven missions, they dropped supplies and evacuated the wounded, flying through hostile airspace in low-altitude, high-risk runs — piloted by volunteers who knew they might not return.
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How Ukrainian spies made Wagner afraid of the desert
HUR’s ambitions haven’t stopped at Ukraine’s borders. The Washington Post reported that in late 2024, Ukrainian intelligence sent around 20 experienced drone operators and around 150 first-person view (FPV) drones to Syrian rebels to assist in the fight against the Assad Regime — an echo of Budanov’s earlier pledge that Ukraine would hunt down Russia’s war criminals “in any part of the world.”
In Africa, HUR has supported efforts to attack Wagner mercenaries in Sudan and Mali, including an ambush in Mali that killed 84 Wagner mercenaries. Serhii Kuzan, chair of the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center, claims that among the Russian mercenaries killed in Mali were numerous criminals who had previously fought in Eastern Ukraine, some dating back as far as 2014.
Bah Traoré Legrand, a researcher from Senegal, noted that “Due to the current dynamics of international geopolitics, Mali has become the backdrop for indirect clashes between Russia and Ukraine.”
However, not everyone is convinced Ukraine had a direct hand in the operation — a view reinforced by HUR spokesperson Andriy Yusov, who claimed Kyiv provided the Malian rebels only the “necessary” information to carry out the attack.
Antonio Giustozzi, a Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), also cast doubt on Ukraine’s involvement in Mali, pointing out that no solid evidence links it directly to the operation.
“If there was an involvement, it was likely by providing some funding and perhaps some equipment to rebel groups in Mali,” he said.
These operations, however, have clearly unnerved Moscow. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has accused Ukraine of “opening a second front in Africa,” claiming Kyiv now seeks to destabilize Russia wherever it can.
From Syria to Sudan — and deep inside Russia itself — HUR’s expanding shadow war reflects Ukraine’s psychological campaign aimed at shaking Moscow’s grip on influence and fear.
“They [the Ukrainians] have to prove to African countries that the Russians are not all-powerful and can also lose,” said Irina Filatova, a Russian historian based in South Africa.
Tensions boiled over in April 2025. During a press conference in Moscow, Mali’s Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop — standing beside Russia’s Sergey Lavrov — labeled Ukraine a “terrorist state.” The outrage stemmed from a deadly strike in Mali that killed Wagner-linked fighters.
Kyiv fired back. Yevhen Dykyi, former commander of Ukraine’s Aidar Battalion and a military analist, added that Ukraine is determined to hunt down Wagner mercenaries wherever they operate — including across Africa, having “a score to settle.”
“The true threat to African stability and progress is the Russian Wagner mercenaries, who bring nothing but death, destruction, and plunder wherever they go,” declared a spokesperson for Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry in response to the accusations.
When Ukraine’s revenge became the West’s best investment
These moves leave little doubt: Ukraine has no intention of halting its global campaign against Russian mercenaries. On the contrary, the operation is gaining momentum. And if the West stepped up support for HUR’s worldwide missions — even with modest investments — the returns could be game-changing.
Such backing could help Ukraine erode Russia’s expanding influence in Africa, disrupt Wagner’s operations, and strengthen local resistance to authoritarian entrenchment.
“Russia essentially benefits from its African involvement by gaining votes in the UN assembly and by showing Western powers that it has the ability to undermine their interests in various parts of the world,” Giustozzi said.
Mick Ryan, a former Australian major general, echoed that point. He argued that Ukraine’s growing reach — from Africa to the Middle East — sends a clear signal: the West has far less to fear from Russia than it imagines. Even in war-torn Afghanistan, Moscow is no longer seen as untouchable — increasingly seen not as a global force, but as a frequent target of Kyiv’s drone strikes
In contrast, the Biden administration’s early posture in 2022 was shaped by fear of escalation and crossing Putin’s self-proclaimed “red lines.” While Ukrainian forces reclaimed occupied territory, Washington hesitated. The White House didn’t enable a Ukrainian victory — it played it safe.
However, history shows that bold intelligence work can help bend history toward justice. During World War II, Czech and British agents assassinated Nazi leader Reinhard Heydrich, while Mossad hunted down and eliminated members of Black September responsible for the Munich Olympics massacre.
When the war ends, Ukraine’s spycraft may remain shrouded in secrecy — but its impact will be undeniable. As CIA Director John Ratcliffe recently put it, this is a nation ready to “fight with their bare hands if they have to, if they don’t have terms that are acceptable to an enduring peace.”
In the years to come, NATO intelligence services will look to their Ukrainian counterparts not as students, but as peers. Ukraine has already shown what it means to punch above its weight. This is a nation, after all, that the current CIA Director John Ratcliffe recently described as willing to “fight with their bare hands if they have to, if they don’t have terms that are acceptable to an enduring peace.”