In April, New Zealand announced it aimed to nearly double defense spending to reach 2% of its GDP in the next eight years—a step that marks a major shift in New Zealand’s national security strategy.
While a member of the Anglosphere “Five Eyes” intelligence alliance, New Zealand has not sufficiently funded its defense in decades.
It also previously sought a close relationship with the People’s Republic of China, with former governments pursuing economic relations with China over geopolitical alignment with the U.S. and neighboring Australia.
In 2008, for example, New Zealand and China signed a free trade agreement, one of Beijing’s first with a Western state. Since then, China has become New Zealand’s main trading partner, ahead of Australia and the U.S.
This close economic relationship has also affected political ties between New Zealand and China—a fact best evidenced by a 2019 visit to Beijing by then-Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern.
Recently, however, New Zealand has begun to wake up to the dangers of an overly collaborative relationship with the Chinese Communist Party. In 2022, at the end of her term as prime minister, Ardern acknowledged that China had become more assertive—though she still failed to offer any tangible means of addressing this problem.
In November, New Zealand issued technology warnings for companies and citizens working in China, an acknowledgement of China’s aggressive economic tactics.
In March 2024, New Zealand’s intelligence agency accused China of cyber espionage after discovering hacked data systems associated with New Zealand’s parliament. The head of the intelligence agency condemned China for “malicious cyber activity,” and recently-elected conservative Prime Minister Christopher Luxon asserted that liberal democracies have a responsibility to call China out for its cyber espionage activities.
Incidents like this, and the election of Luxon, have contributed to New Zealand’s gradual recognition both of China’s malign influence and of the need for a more active foreign and defense policy from Wellington.
New Zealand’s 2025 Defense Capability Plan acknowledges that investments need to be made to “first stabilize the New Zealand Defense Forces (NZDF) and then build it to be better prepared for future events.” The defense capability plan includes significant investments in frigate sustainment, maritime helicopters, enhanced strike capabilities, and improved intelligence functions and cybersecurity.
This poses a clear contrast to New Zealand’s 2023 national security strategy under Ardern’s government, which had more photos of scenic hikes and references to climate change than it does to weapon acquisition and China.
New Zealand’s historic neglect of defense spending will not be solved overnight, and despite Luxon’s goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense, he has emphasized starting with capability rather than spending.
Nonetheless, the Defense Capability Plan has provided some clarity by recognizing the capability gaps facing the New Zealand Defense Forces and indicating potential pathways to address them. That said, its investments are not guaranteed. According to the prime minister, each individual purchase will be presented to the cabinet for approval and the plan will be reviewed every two years.
The U.S. pursues a free and open Indo-Pacific—so it should welcome and encourage steps by New Zealand and others to move in the right direction on China policy and defense spending. Luxon should be applauded for taking his country’s sovereignty seriously and working to strengthen it.