On Jan. 29, 2024, three American service members were killed and over 40 wounded when a drone exploded inside a U.S. base in Jordan.
That was the first time in over 70 years that U.S. troops died in a direct enemy air attack—and those deaths didn’t come from jets or missiles. They came from a cheap, improvised drone that slipped past our air defenses.
That attack should’ve been a wake-up call. Unfortunately, we’re still hitting snooze.
Unmanned aerial systems, or drones, are no longer niche threats. They’ve gone from tools of major powers to everyday weapons for militias and rogue states. They’re small, they’re cheap, and they work. With the right setup, a $200 quadcopter can drop a grenade on a vehicle or blind an artillery unit.
Iran knows this. Russia knows this. Even ISIS figured it out years ago. Meanwhile, the U.S. military is still struggling to get effective counter-drone tools into the hands of regular troops.
The Ukraine conflict shows us where things are headed. There, both sides have used drones for surveillance, sabotage, and direct attacks.
Russia’s use of Iranian-made Shahed drones has devastated Ukrainian infrastructure—but Ukraine is hitting back with its own systems, some of which are being developed specifically for swarming attacks. These drone swarms operate like coordinated flocks, designed to overwhelm defenses through sheer volume.
Yet even though the U.S. is watching this development play out in real time, it hasn’t adapted nearly fast enough.
To be fair, we’ve taken some steps. The Pentagon established the Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, and it’s begun testing tools like Lockheed Martin’s MORFIUS (a non-kinetic jammer) and the APKWS, a precision-guided rocket that can target drones.
These systems are promising—but only if we actually use them.
Right now, most U.S. forces don’t have access to them. Many don’t even know how to use counter-drone tech at all.
That’s a big problem. In 2023, Maj. Gen. Sean Gainey acknowledged that the military simply hadn’t prioritized training on counter-small unmanned aircraft systems. That’s slowly changing—basic trainees at Fort Sill have started getting instruction on counter-drone operations—but we’re still far from where we need to be.
Every soldier should have at least a basic understanding of how to identify and respond to drone threats. This can’t be something that’s reserved for special units or higher echelons. It has to be part of the standard tool kit for all warfighters.
There’s also an issue of cost. A U.S. ally reportedly used a $3 million Patriot missile to shoot down a $200 drone. That’s the kind of exchange we simply can’t afford. We need cheap, scalable, and reliable countermeasures. Otherwise, we’re going to burn through our best air defense systems trying to shoot down drones made with off-the-shelf parts. That’s not strategy, that’s desperation.
Another concern is identification. How do you know a drone is a threat? Can you tell the difference between a surveillance drone and one carrying explosives? Between a U.S. system and a hostile one?
These questions matter, especially in combat zones with multiple players in the air. Without clear identification tools and coordination across the services and our allies, we’re setting ourselves up for fratricide or missed opportunities. We need better protocols, and we need them now.
A cautionary note: Despite some claims to the contrary, drones have not revolutionized every aspect of warfare, and traditional systems—such as armor, manned warships, and fighter jets—will continue their prominent roles in military operations.
However, the proliferation of drones among non-state actors and the potential for large states to deploy drones at scale do present an increasingly lethal challenge to which the United States will need to adapt.
America still has time to lead in counter-drone warfare, but not much. We need to ramp up training, deploy the tools we already have, and invest in smarter systems that are built for real-world use, not just glossy briefings.
More important, we need to stop thinking of drones as a “future threat.” The future is already here. And it’s flying low.