The Patriots should be 2-0.
Instead, they have two big problems.
No. 1: pass protection.
For a second straight week, Jacoby Brissett came under fire like he was playing out of a trench. Brissett faced pressure on 44% of his dropbacks, a frighteningly high percentage that matched the sky-high pressure rate he saw at Cincinnati. In the last nine days, the Patriots have also lost one left tackle to injury and another to irony in that Chukwuma Okorafor, well, left.
No. 2: the play-callers are green.
Seattle out-foxed offensive coordinator Alex Van Pelt and turned defensive coordinator DeMarcus Covington’s aggression against him in critical situations Sunday. The Seahawks protected themselves against all of Van Pelt’s deep play-action shots, while Seattle offensive coordinator Ryan Grubb burned the Pats’ trademark all-out blitzes for a touchdown in the first quarter and two back-breaking first downs in overtime.
All three times, Grubb predicted blitz, got blitz and burned blitz. And did I mention Seattle stole from a Bill Belichick blocking scheme to beat it? More on that later.
The Patriots’ wide receivers live at the intersection of their offensive problems. They cannot catch the ball if Brissett is not protected and/or if Van Pelt doesn’t scheme targets for them. The wideouts were held to three catches for 19 yards.
So what happened? In addition to bringing a barrage of pressure, the Seahawks defended half of the Patriots’ passing plays in man-to-man and allowed three yards per play. Playing zone, they dropped into a mix of traditional spot-drop and other versions with matchup principles, yielding just 5.5 yards per dropback.
Sacks don’t tell full story behind Patriots’ offensive line woes
That split, and how effective Seattle was playing both coverage families, says everything about the Pats' passing woes: blame belongs to everybody. The truth about wide receivers is coaches get them open versus zone, but they must free themselves against man-to-man. Neither happened often enough, especially in light of the Patriots' protection issues.
And yet, the Pats were still just one field goal and one defensive stop away from their second upset in as many weeks; meaning this loss is shared by those phases, too, and they enjoyed small successes along the way.
Here's what the film revealed about the Patriots' loss:
Turnovers: Patriots 0, Seahawks 0
Explosive play rate: Patriots 7.5%, Seahawks 3.0%
Success rate: Patriots 44%, Seahawks 49%
Red-zone efficiency: Patriots 2-4, Seahawks 1-3
Defensive pressure rate: Patriots 27%, Seahawks 46.8%
Accurate throw percentage: 76.2%
Under pressure: 4-of-11 for 47 yards, 3 sacks
Against the blitz: 3-of-4 for 32 yards
Behind the line: 2-of-2 for 37 yards
0-9 yards downfield: 11-of-14 for 97 yards
10-19 yards downfield: 2-of-4 for 15 yards, TD
20+ yards downfield: 0-of-1
Notes: Believe it or not, Jacoby Brissett is playing well enough.
Through two weeks, he ranks 10th in QBR, a refined version of passer rating that (unlike its namesake) accounts for fumbles, scrambles and game situations. He ranks 10th in success rate, a reflection of how well a quarterback keeps his offense on schedule.
This, of course, does not square with Brissett's traditional box-score stats or the eye test. The chief reason for those discrepancies is Brissett's greatest strengths – avoiding sacks and protecting the ball – are not captured by traditional metrics, which also do not consider his atypical circumstances. Again, consider the avalanche of pressure he's facing.
Brissett has been hit or hurried 28 times, but despite that, he's allowed pressure to result in sacks – a quarterback-driven stat – just 14% of the time. It's a miracle. And it's keeping the Patriots' offense alive, because sacks kill drives.
You saw this Sunday, when the Patriots punted on every possession Brissett went backwards. Whereas, when he avoided pressure, they often scored. Brissett ripped two completions after side-stepping rushers on the first touchdown drive. Then he beat a blitz on the Pats' next series, which led to a field goal, and scrambled to sustain a field goal drive later in the first half.
As a passer, Brissett has not been overwhelmingly accurate or aggressive. The so-so accuracy is a staple of his game as one of the NFL's 20th-to-30th-best quarterbacks. This is no surprise.
But Brissett must attack more downfield. Of course, he will need help. That starts with Van Pelt's play-calling and the receivers separating deep, since the offensive line's current slate of injuries indicates the pass protection will get worse before it gets better.
Personnel breakdown: 58% of snaps in 11 personnel, 33% snaps in 12 personnel, 6% snaps in 13 personnel, 3% in jumbo personnel.***
Personnel production: 31.5% success rate in 11 personnel, 54.5% success rate in 12 personnel, 75% success rate in 13 personnel, 100% in jumbo personnel.
First-down down play-calls: 64% run (44% success rate), 36% pass (40% success rate)
Play-action rate: 20.6%
Offensive coordinator Alex Van Pelt worked from another run-heavy plan built on man-blocked runs (power, counter and duo) and the belief the Patriots had receiving mismatches in tight ends Hunter Henry and Austin Hooper. Henry piled up 109 yards working the vacated middle of the field against Seattle's two-deep structure early, often sitting down against zone. Hooper even shared the field with him in obvious passing situations, playing half of the Patriots' third-down snaps before halftime.
Targeting the tight ends helped avoid matchup problems outside, where Seattle cornerbacks Devon Witherspoon and Riq Woolen could handle every Patriots receiver they faced. When Van Pelt wanted to take shots outside, Seattle was prepared; something Brissett mentioned post-game citing a "tell."
If there was a tell, it may have been game situation. The Seahawks short-circuited Van Pelt's first deep play-action pass from midfield (a popular area for shot plays) with a blitz on first-and-10. Later, after the Patriots defense had forced a turnover on downs, Seattle dropped two safeties 30 yards downfield to deny a play-action bomb Van Pelt called on the next play from scrimmage (a popular time for shot plays). Brissett scrambled.
Overall, the Pats stalled when the Seahawks began flexing their coverage advantage in the second quarter, pivoting to more man-to-man and loaded boxes. After posting a 56% success rate on their opening three drives, the Pats produced a dismal 23.5% success rate over their next four possessions, which stretched into the fourth quarter. It was then that the offense finally freed itself with an adjustment.
Van Pelt called four outside zone runs in five plays at the start of their last touchdown drive. Within those calls, he sprinkled in a pin-and-pull variation to keep Seattle off-balance; a scheme that includes man and zone-blocking principles and birthed rushes of nine and later 45 yards for Antonio Gibson.
But forced to pass in the final minute and start of overtime, the Patriots had no shot. Their 31.5% success rate from 11 personnel (three wide receivers, one running back, tight end) is downright abysmal, and yet that has been their most common personnel grouping in each of the first two games. Changes are due: either in the snaps allocated to these receivers or a wholesale shift toward multiple tight ends or running backs.
Broken tackles: RB Rhamondre Stevenson 3, RB Antonio Gibson 3, QB Jacoby Brissett
Pressure allowed: LT Vederian Lowe 4 (3 hurries, QB hit), RG Layden Robinson 4 (3 hurries, sack), RT Mike Onwenu 3 (2 hurries, QB hit), LG Michael Jordan (sack), QB Jacoby Brissett (sack), Team (hurry)
Run stuffs allowed: Team 3, Onwenu
Drops: TE Hunter Henry
Personnel breakdown: 51% three-corner nickel package, 25% dime, 22% three-safety nickel, 1% base, 1% goal-line.****
Coverage breakdown: 70% zone, 30% man
Blitz rate: 27%
Blitz efficacy: 69% offensive success rate and 13.2 yards per play allowed
The Seahawks waited them out.
Seattle knew the Patriots would eventually dip into their preferred Cover 0 AKA all-out blitz package, which features several variations but ultimately trusts their secondary to cover 1-on-1 downfield. The Seahawks burned them initially on Metcalf's touchdown, then again on their final first-down conversions in overtime to set up a game-winning field goal.
Overall, Seattle quarterback Geno Smith went 10-of-12 for 171 yards, a touchdown, one sack and a scramble versus the blitz. The worst part? Seattle used a blocking scheme Bill Belichick concocted to beat his old defense.
During a divisional-round playoff game at Denver in 2006, the Patriots motioned a wide receiver to block an edge defender at the snap and eliminate the Broncos' man advantage when running all-out blitzes that banked on the fact they could always rush one more defender than the offense could handle. That receiver, covered by a defensive back, temporarily left his defender in no man's land and allowed Tom Brady extra time because his block prevented the defense from overloading the offensive line with blitzers. Eventually, the Broncos defender in coverage would blitz, too, but by then Brady had time to attack downfield, instead of throwing short.
That's exactly what Smith did on Metcalf's touchdown.
The Patriots' initial plan consisted mostly of creative four-man pressures backed by soft zone, and one zone-blitz that triggered a Keion White/Daniel Ekuale sack. Defensive coordinator DeMarcus Covington allowed safety Kyle Dugger to make frequent checks at the line to combat Seattle's regular audibles, but the Seahawks stayed a step ahead. Smith was hardly bothered after the initial sack, always detecting when and where the Patriots would send extra pressure.
It felt like the Pats were often pressing to force Seattle off-schedule, save for a fourth-and-1 stop early in the third quarter, and eventually ran out of options in overtime.
On the last possession before halftime, Covington called a zone blitz on third-and-7 at midfield, where the Seahawks needed at least 10 yards to get into field goal range. Anything short of the sticks, and they would have punted. They didn't, they got more and eventually kicked a field goal.
His most curious call was another third-and-7 prior to the fourth-down stop, when Smith hit a 24-yard completion against a zone blitz that dropped White and Joshua Uche more than 20 yards downfield. Sometimes, it's the simpler the better.
Pressure: DL Keion White 4 (1.5 sacks, QB hit, hurry), LB Raekwon McMillan 2 (2 hurries), S Kyle Dugger (sack), DL Daniel Ekuale (0.5 sack), OLB Joshua Uche (QB hit), DL Deatrich Wise (hurry), DL Jeremiah Pharms Jr. (hurry), DB Marcus Jones (hurry), Team (hurry)
Run-stuffs: Team 2, Wise
Pass deflections: CB Christian Gonzalez, S Jaylinn Hawkins, Jones, Wise
Missed tackles: Jones 3, Dugger, McMillan, White, LB Jahlani Tavai, LB Anfernee Jennings
TE Hunter Henry
A career-high 109 receiving yards says it all.
RB Antonio Gibson
Gibson's 45-yard run started by forcing a missed tackle and finished as the Patriots' longest play of the day. He was, for one game, better than Stevenson, even in limited action.
RT Mike Onwenu
The Patriots need more from their best offensive linemen, especially in pass protection.
LT Vederian Lowe
Currently out with a knee injury, it says something the Patriots would be better off with Lowe, who has allowed four pressures in back-to-back games.
Statistics for passing depth, broken tackles and missed tackles courtesy of Pro Football Focus.
*Explosive plays are defined as runs of 12-plus yards and passes of 20-plus yards. After turnover margin, explosive play rate is the metric most strongly correlated with winning.
**Success rate is an efficiency metric measuring how often an offense stays on schedule. A play is successful when it gains at least 40% of yards-to-go on first down, 60% of yards-to-go on second down and 100% of yards-to-go on third or fourth down.
***11 personnel = one running back, one tight end; 12 personnel = one running back, two tight ends; 13 personnel = one running back, three tight ends; jumbo = two halfbacks, three tight ends.
****Base defense = four defensive backs; nickel defense = five defensive backs; dime defense = six defensive backs; goal-line defense = three defensive backs.