Vladimir Putin was right when he said that the Wagner Group mutiny was akin to the 1917 mutiny of the Russian army — part of the revolution that ended the rule of the czars — but it is not clear that he realizes the full impact of the analogy.
There were two mutinies in 1917. One happened in the ranks of the French army on the Western Front, the result of that year’s disastrous Nivelle offensive. Such was the disgust in the ranks at the senseless carnage of World War I that many French units refused to leave their trenches when ordered to attack. Gen. Robert Nivelle was sacked as the leader of the French forces and replaced. (READ MORE: Trouble in Putin’s Gangsta’s Paradise)
The crisis petered out. The French units involved did not desert — they pledged to fight on the defensive but not in senseless offensive operations. No officers had been killed by their soldiers. Some of the most vocal mutineers were executed or otherwise punished. The French gradually instituted the concept of “methodical battle,” which included the coordinated use of artillery and air power to properly prepare the battlefield, as well as the coordinated use of tanks and infantry. This conserved lives, and the French soldiered on.
The Russian mutiny was part of the February 1917 revolution. Some units killed their officers, and many others left the battlefield entirely. Soviet soldiers were formed into units, and votes were taken on whether to continue fighting. The army effectively collapsed, allowing for massive German gains.
The discontent of the Russian army in 1917 mirrors that of the Russian forces in Ukraine today. Many soldiers lacked proper weapons and even uniforms. Supply services failed to provide adequate ammunition and food. Leadership was incompetent from the top down, with an officer class coming largely from the nobility.
Like with Putin’s army now, many of Czar Nicholas II’s top officers were family members, and the monarch needed them to prop up the regime. And as is the case with Putin’s cronies, they could not be fired because they represented his power base. The problems were far beyond the competence of the shaky provisional coalition government that succeeded the czar, and the Bolsheviks took advantage of the situation to seize power in the October Revolution.
Putin Couldn’t Cave to the Mutiny
The difference between the two mutinies is stark. The French democracy proved much more resilient than the Russian czarist autocracy. The French people may have been dissatisfied with the performance of their generals, but they remained united in their desire to beat the Germans — something Putin should really consider. (READ MORE: Democracy and Its Lunkheads)
French democracy since the French Revolution in 1789 has been — and still is — imperfect, but ultimately the will of the electorate counts. Civilian control of the military had been a key element of French democracy since the disastrous reign of Napoleon II and the Franco-Prussian War. The French premier had no qualms about sacking Nivelle to end the mutiny.
Contrast that with the dilemma faced by Putin. Had he caved to Prigozhin’s demands that he sack the chief of the general staff and the defense minister, he would be in danger of losing the support of the military, possibly resulting in a coup. The fact that the Wagner troops were enthusiastically welcomed along their aborted march to Moscow is a testament to Putin’s diminishing popularity among Russians. Despite strict censorship, the public seems to be aware of the desperate state of the war.
The primary difference between this mutiny and that of 1917 is that, unlike the Bolsheviks, who were willing to negotiate with Germany so that they could turn their military arm on their political opponents, Prigozhin is more hardline than even Putin.
Autocrats like Putin thrive when things seem relatively prosperous and trains run on time, but the Russian people have been subjected to military humiliation, a worsening economy, and a break from most of the Western world for over a year. The support of tinpot dictators in Africa and other rogue states such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Iran must be cold comfort to the relatively sophisticated citizens of Moscow and St. Petersburg. If Putin is not worried, he is almost certainly delusional.
Gary Anderson lectures on Red Teaming and war gaming at the George Washington University’s Elliott Scholl of International Affairs.
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