Some conservatives, most prominently Vivek Ramaswamy, think the United States can flip Russia from foe to friend and end the Ukraine war. Ramaswamy has promised he would break up the Russia-China alliance — a nifty reversal of Nixon-to-China. It will be so simple, just drop by the Kremlin and present his uber-brilliant “America and Russia: Let’s Be Friends” PowerPoint and voila! All geopolitical problems are solved!

Well, maybe not. Unfortunately for Ramaswamy, Vladimir Putin and his henchmen are a much tougher crowd than Sequoia Capital or any other overfunded, gullible venture capital firm. The thinking that the Russia and China partnership is fundamentally flawed or easily broken is an absurd fantasy shared by Ramaswamy and elements of the American foreign policy establishment. Ramaswamy has an excuse — he is uneducated in the topic, informed by vacuous Twitter posts and fringy-cringey YouTubers. The foreign policy boffins have no excuse for their foolishness.

Nixon to China: 15 Years in the Making

The Nixon-to-China coup had its origins in 1953. The death of Stalin was the beginning of a thaw in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union — a rapprochement not welcomed by the doctrinaire revolutionary Mao Tze-Tung. As Khrushchev pursed “peaceful coexistence,” Mao plunged China into the disastrous Great Leap Forward, annexed Tibet, attacked India (a nation that tilted toward the Soviets), and generally positioned China as the true revolutionary power of the left. (READ MORE from Keith Naughton: Just Give Me a Number: Trump v. Biden)

In the mid-1960s, the Soviets contemplated a first strike on the Chinese nuclear facility in Lop Nur. By 1968 relations had become so bitter that border clashes had begun, leading to a full-on armed confrontation on Damansky Island. Convulsed by the Cultural Revolution, desperately poor, and facing a technologically superior enemy with few allies, China was in difficult straits.

Only then was China ready to parley with the United States. Even then, it took three years of preparation, including intermediation by Pakistan and Romania, so-called “ping pong diplomacy,” and a secret visit by Henry Kissinger to set the stage for Nixon to visit.

In short, Nixon did not just parachute into Beijing with a nifty slide show.

The Geopolitics of Common Interest 

Even with patience and preparation, however, fully separating Russia and China today is well-nigh impossible as the economic and geopolitical logic is nothing like that of the Nixon era. In 1972, China was an isolated, poverty-stricken autarky. Economic relations with Russia were virtually nil. Today, the nations’ economies are highly complementary. China is a manufacturing and technology (even if much of it is stolen) superpower in need of vast amounts of imported energy, food, and raw materials.

Russia has just what China needs. In addition, Russia is and always has been weak in manufacturing, producing mostly shoddy goods uncompetitive on the global market. Whether as the Russian Empire, Soviet Union, or the current Putin kleptocracy, Russia has never been able to harness its resources and human capital to become a center of manufacturing excellence — and shows no signs of turning that corner. So China has what Russia needs. (READ MORE: Another GOP Fail: The Free Ride for Ukraine Nobody Will Take) 

Alternately, what does the United States have to offer Russia? America does not need Russian energy or food. Mining and minerals could be a source of trade, but there are other, better options such as Australia, Canada, and domestically (if the left ever realizes that the New Green Deal needs lithium, cobalt, and copper). America can offer some higher quality products and technology, but as a demographically declining, corruption-riddled nation, Russia will reach for cheapness over quality. In short, Russia has little America wants and does not really want what America offers.

Russian and Chinese political and cultural interests converge as strongly as the economic. Both are authoritarian regimes who deny individual rights, considering the population mere instruments of the state (which has a long tradition in both countries). China and Russia believe the rights of small nations are subordinate and consider neighboring states as part of their respective spheres of influence. They have an expansive view of their own history and are separate “civilizations” from the West, even as their societies have largely been subsumed by Western culture and thought (including Marxism).

More significantly, China and Russia went through over 25 years of post-Cold War Western, neoliberal expectations that they would become just like the West — after all, why wouldn’t they? For two nations with difficult and traumatic histories — and much of that trauma due to the aggression of outsiders — 1990s Western arrogance is too much to swallow.

So, no, Russia is not switching teams any time soon.

Tentatively Allied

Even though the chances of a Russo-Chinese conflict on the level of the Sino-Soviet split are virtually nil, that does not mean there is no opportunity to degrade the current relationship. Tensions due to history, pride, and economics exist and could be used to fan distrust and limit cooperation. For all the Chinese complaints about the 19th Century Opium Wars and exploitation by the British and French, it is Imperial Russia (the true progenitor of the Putin regime) that exploited China the greatest. Even today, Russia still holds territory seized from China in the 1860 Treaty of Peking.

Given Putin’s behavior and Russia’s history of predation, China can hardly consider Russia trustworthy. A nation dependent on raw material and food imports cannot allow itself to rely on one nation, particularly rapacious Russia. Russia is a shrinking, rapidly aging nation with falling median income — not much of an outlet for high-end, sophisticated goods, but fine for dumping cheap stuff. (READ MORE: The Rank Foolishness of ‘Proportional Response’)

For Russia there is even more danger. In terms of their respective populations and technological and aggregate wealth, the disparity between the two countries is enormous. Russia is at risk of becoming a vassal state, qualifying as a subordinate nation in China’s sphere of influence. Too much “alliance” with China risks a humiliating future.

Taking advantage of the structural tensions will be an opportunistic, case-by-case effort. But trying to achieve a fundamental realignment would be a fool’s errand. Too bad there are plenty of fools in the West who prefer fantasy over reality.

But perhaps Ramaswamy and his fellow travelers are just smarter than anyone else. He certainly thinks so. I have my doubts.