In most contexts, if I told you that variable X increased psychological health, the natural response would be “tell me more about the positive possibilities of variable X.” For example, if I said to you that five decades of research shows that reducing computer/phone screen time makes people happier, it would be quite natural to respond: “I wonder how we can reduce screen time without causing any other harms.”

Thus, it is curious that, after almost five decades of research showing that conservatism is associated with psychological health, scientists aren’t vigorously pursuing the potentially positive lessons we can learn from conservatism to improve mental happiness in this country. Instead, the oft-observed finding that American conservatives are happier than liberals has long been a source of consternation in my (overwhelmingly liberal) field of social psychology. Rather than wanting to maximize any psychological wisdom of conservative philosophy, psychologists have largely set about to either explain away or (failing that) reframe these findings to minimize a positive interpretation of all things conservative. It would be analogous to researchers reacting to the news that reducing phone usage is good for people by casting those happy phone-avoiders as bullies (how dare they?) who have conspired to keep others unhappy by pushing the wrong kind of screen time on them. (READ MORE from Luke Conway: Republicans Are Missing the Point of Trump — Again)

Although the finding that conservatives in the United States are happier than liberals has not gone entirely unchallenged and some data do suggest some qualifiers — something I’ll return to below — generally speaking, in my field the debate has been more about why conservatives are happier than if they are. Indeed, the data on the “if” question don’t appear to have changed much over the years. For example, a recent Columbia study revealed that conservative adolescents are less prone to depression than liberal adolescents. So rather than debating the if question, I will instead tackle the question that seems most relevant to the current data: what does social psychology have to say about why conservatives are happier?

Two Social Psychological Theories of Conservative Happiness

There are two extant theories. The first and more influential theory is that conservatives are comfortable with inequality and unconcerned with societal fairness. This tendency towards “system justifying” attitudes — attitudes that make conservatives insensitive to the needs of groups suffering in society — tends to serve as a buffer against bad stuff in their world. It makes them believe they live in a world where their group is on top of a system that is totally fair and justifies their own ethnic and political biases. As a result of this set of system justification blinders, conservatives believe they are at the top of a good system — and that is why they are happier than the lower-status, accurate, compassionate liberals.

Back in 2008, Napier and Jost, in arguably the most influential scientific paper on the topic (a paper that has been cited over 800 times), said it this way: “[I]nequality takes a greater psychological toll on liberals than on conservatives, apparently because liberals lack ideological rationalizations that would help them frame inequality in a positive (or at least neutral) light.” In other words, conservatives have fictitious rationalizations that make inequality seem just fine and that’s why they are happier.

The second theory is that conservatism tends to promote good psychological adjustment. As far back as 2012, social psychology researchers have suggested that conservatives were happier because conservative ideology is associated with personal agency, religiosity, optimism, emotional stability, and other variables that in turn are associated with positive psychological adjustment. In the words of Schlenker and colleagues: “Conservatives appear to have qualities that are traditionally associated with positive adjustment and mental health. When we examined established measures of personal agency, positive outlook, and transcendent moral beliefs (i.e., religiosity, moral commitment, tolerance of transgressions), we found ideological differences that accounted for the happiness gap.”

While both views have adherents within social psychology, there is no doubt that the system justification perspective is the dominant paradigm. Indeed, the system justification view permeates much of the literature down to the present day, often to the exclusion of debate or discussion. For example, in the recent Columbia study noted earlier, what was researchers’ interpretation of why they found better psychological health among conservative adolescents? They essentially ignored all research on conservatism and psychosocial adjustment. Instead, they interpreted their findings through a system justification lens:

We found that conservative 12th-grade students consistently reported fewer internalizing symptoms than those with other political beliefs, suggesting that, in agreement with SJT, common aspects of a conservative identity are equally as protective for adolescent mental health as for adult mental health (Napier & Jost, 2008; Taylor, 2008). Among the most socially privileged group, male adolescents with highly educated parents, conservative ideology may work as a psychological buffer by harmonizing an idealized worldview with the bleak external realities experienced by many (Jost et al., 2008). This group presumably benefits from the American cultural myth of an equal playing field in which exceptional social positions are thought to be earned through hard-work and talent rather than inherited through codified privilege.

In this and other work, researchers tend to focus everything through a lens of “conservatism has benefits due to its propagation of falsities that benefit the groups in power.” Note the use of the words “idealized” and “bleak external realities” and “cultural myth” and “thought to be earned through hard work” (italics mine). The overwhelming tenor of these explanations is that conservatives gain benefits through evil means — they justify keeping other people down and as a result, have better mental health.

So Why Are Conservatives Happier?

I should be clear up front: We should not cut up data on either side so that it makes a point we find politically convenient. Rather, our discussion should entirely turn on what is true; not what is politically expedient. We should face the facts as they are. If facts showed that conservatives were happier because, say, they are (allegedly) racist, then we should face that fact—and try to change it by offering other and better routes to conservative psychological health. So I believe that we need to look at the question honestly. (READ MORE: Leftists Scramble to Explain Why Conservatives Are Happier Than Liberals)

Some evidence does suggest that mere psychological adjustment isn’t enough to explain conservative happiness. For example, in the Columbia study, ethnic minority conservatives got less benefit from conservatism than white conservatives. While that could be interpreted through many lenses, it does give pause to a single, unilateral psychological view that suggests we can solve the nation’s psychological crisis by promoting political conservatism. Further, the prima facie case that believing one is in the dominant group brings more life satisfaction than being in a less dominant group is quite strong. So almost certainly, conservatives believing that they are a member of a successful group will in part make them happier for the reasons system justification suggests.

With those caveats out of the way, let’s evaluate the current state of this question. Part of the problem with past research is that it tends to conflate nasty-sounding “system justification” beliefs with perfectly healthy beliefs that would lead to good outcomes without any system-justifying component. For example, one of Napier and Jost’s primary measurements of system justifying beliefs was a single item anchored by “hard work doesn’t generally bring success, it’s more a matter of luck” on one end and “in the long run, hard work usually brings a better life” at the other.

Stop reading for one minute and think about that. In their view, believing that hard work usually is associated with success makes you a “system justifier” because that belief inherently blames people for the bad outcomes they get. But I’m not so sure about the immutability of that association. While it is possible that belief in hard work can be system-justifying, it need not be so. “If I work hard to prune this tree, it will be more likely to grow fruit” does not seem especially system justifying, as it doesn’t necessarily involve any social systems. Indeed, the two things are conceptually orthogonal. I might believe that hard work generally leads to good outcomes and yet believe that nonetheless this occurs in spite of admitted societal unfairness. To use the oft-trotted-out metaphor, I might believe that some people are born on third base and yet also believe that working hard to get to home plate increases the likelihood of scoring a run. Whether or not there is an influence of one’s unearned position in society on wealth (which there clearly is), there still can be an influence of hard work on wealth (which there clearly is).

Thus, while it is certainly possible for someone to hold a belief in hard work to blame others’ failures on their lack of hard work, it need not be so. And there is no denying that believing in hard work also produces agency — the belief that one can make a difference — which is psychologically healthy. However you got to third base, it is pretty certain that you are likely to stay there if you don’t think running the bases matters. A belief that “running matters” is thus very likely to be associated with progress towards home.

So what happens when we try to separate the psychological adjustment and system justification models? Several years ago, our lab conducted a set of 5 studies to evaluate that question. We pitted the system justification theory against the psychological adjustment theory. What we found provides an anchor for understanding the modern debate surrounding this issue. (READ MORE: The Big Guy)

First, we found that direct measurements of a desire for social group inequality — the hallmark of the system justification explanation, a variable called “Social Dominance” — did not explain why conservatives were happy at all. To be fair, conservatives are more likely to endorse certain kinds of group inequality as acceptable — even in some fairly nasty-sounding ways — and that’s not good. But that has nothing to do with why they are happier.

Second, three variable sets associated with psychological adjustment — religiosity, belief in hard work/achievement, and anti-entitlement attitudes — were good predictors of conservative happiness. In fact, the two strongest explanatory variables in our dataset for understanding why conservatives are happier were anti-entitlement (a mindset opposed to the idea that the world owes one something personally) and attained achievement (for example, the belief that they had succeeded at work).

Third, Jost and Napier’s System Justification Scale, which is essentially a measurement of the degree that Americans believe American society is a good place, was in fact one of the better predictors of conservative happiness across our five studies. However, the system justification scale was also related to beliefs generally associated with psychological adjustment (hard work, religiosity). So even though the “system justification” scale explained part of conservative happiness, this is not overwhelmingly good evidence for the nastier implications of the system justification model. At worst for conservatives, it means that they are happier in part because living in a society they like makes them happy. While I want liberals and conservatives to both love American society equally, I’m not convinced that the fact that they don’t makes the strong “system justification” case that theorists from that camp suggest.

Why Should We Care About This?

As noted earlier, the recent Columbia study suggested that the primary reason liberals were more depressed is because they care more about societal injustice. The article is replete with arguments like this one: “disparities in internalizing symptoms for female liberal adolescents may be due to a joint awareness (via liberalism) and experience (via sexism) of injustice which is further exacerbated by societal disenfranchisement for lower SES groups.”

There is a tendency to dismiss such interpretations as unimportant academic-speak. After all, who cares what a few academics say in abstract terms? And regardless, they may be partially right here if one defines societal justice by very narrow parameters, and there is little denying that believing one’s group is disenfranchised provides psychological challenges. Conservatives on most college campuses are disenfranchised, for example, and that doesn’t feel good for them. So when the shoe is on the other foot, it doesn’t take much empathy to realize that it isn’t good for liberals, either.

But I think we should resist the tempting “so there is some academic bias, no big deal” reaction. If these past few weeks of campus antisemitism have shown us nothing else, it is that academic biases have consequences. In this case, there are two reasons we should care, both centering around the loss of knowledge from assuming a theory is true where it (at best) can provide only an incomplete view of what is happening. (READ MORE: The Paradoxical Decline of Female Happiness in Egalitarian Norway)

First, at a minimum, such researchers often completely miss emphasizing the positive benefits of self-control, religion, hard work, and mental toughness in helping people deal with life’s challenges. In this omission, they do not largely fail conservatives — who are presumably doing those things anyway — they rather fail their liberal constituents by not equipping them with legitimate psychological tools for well-being.

Greg Lukianoff, who, as noted in a Politico article, voted for Obama, wrote a book (The Coddling of the American Mind, with Jonathan Haidt) that argues that principles such as the belief in personal agency actually helped save him from a suicidal depression. These need not be specifically conservative principles, but they are in fact ideas long-held and long-fostered in conservative circles and, according to Lukianoff, under attack in liberal academia. While the causes of depression are deep and multi-faceted and there is no one-size-fits-all solution, ignoring principles just because they appear too “conservative” does not seem in the best interest of … well, of anyone.

Second, and more insidiously, this perspective simply mis-characterizes conservatives as uncaring people who, like rich autocrats stealing from the poor people they rule, gain their happiness at the expense of their lesser brethren. While all people are no doubt subject to such selfish forces, and history is replete with both conservatives and liberals who seemed to live largely at the expense of others, evidence that modern American conservatives are uniquely prone to such attitudes and behavior seems wanting.

For example, a recent four-study article illustrated that conservatives in both the United States and the United Kingdom actually show more empathy to their political enemies than liberals do. In the words of the authors: “conservatives consistently showed more empathy to liberals than liberals showed to conservatives.”

How does evidence such as that square with the theory that conservatism uniquely promotes intolerance, social injustice, and a lack of outgroup empathy? Thus, as an overarching explanation based in social psychological constructs like empathy and helping, it seems difficult to maintain. And in so doing, it falsely demonizes conservatives as the whole problem — when in fact, much conservative psychology could be helpful towards a solution.

 Conservatism Isn’t a Psychological Panacea, But It is Psychologically Useful

Conservatism isn’t a “magic bullet” that mystically produces happiness. We sometimes forget that even moderate effect sizes in our field still mean that most of the variance is not accounted for. Put in non-statistical terms, this means that even if conservatives are, on average, happier than liberals, plenty of liberals are still happy and plenty of conservatives are unhappy. Data on this issue sometimes reveal opposite or conflicting patterns.

So I don’t want the take-away here to be “make everyone a political conservative and the world will be psychologically healthy.” That is clearly untrue. Rather, the takeaway of our journey through the social psychological literature is this: Just as we should not be quick to overinterpret conservative happiness as some kind of cure-all, we should not be quick to dismiss it as the result of negative social forces. Everyone can likely learn something from a conservative focus on personal agency, religion, and resilience — even liberals.

Lucian (Luke) Gideon Conway, III received his Ph.D. in Social Psychology from the University of British Columbia. Conway is professor of psychology at Grove City College and a fellow with the Institute for Faith & Freedom. His work has been featured in major media outlets such as the Washington Post, New York Times, Huffington Post, Psychology Today, USA Today, the Ben Shapiro Podcast, and BBC Radio. Dr. Conway additionally serves as an Associate Editor for the flagship journal of the world’s largest academic society for social psychologists (SPSP), and he is an elected Fellow in both SPSP and the Society of Experimental Social Psychology. He is the author of the books Complex Simplicity: How Psychology Suggests Atheists are Wrong About Christianity and the forthcoming Liberal Bullies: Inside the Mind of the Authoritarian Left.