A high-stakes diplomatic maneuver is quietly taking shape. U.S. President Donald Trump is reportedly weighing whether to re-admit Turkey into the elite F‑35 stealth fighter program — a move that could reshape Middle East alliances. In return, President Erdoğan would support Syria’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords, the U.S.-brokered peace initiative transforming Israel’s regional standing.
Restoring Turkey to the F‑35 program in exchange for a questionable Syrian peace deal risks compromising both military security and diplomatic integrity.
This is being marketed as a win-win: Trump secures a foreign policy victory, Erdoğan regains access to top-tier U.S. defense tech, and Syria appears to emerge from isolation. But this isn’t standard diplomacy — it’s a transactional gambit involving fractured territory and a proxy regime aligned with Ankara’s ambitions.
Mohammad al-Julani, once al-Qaeda’s top man in Syria, now acts as the de facto governor of the Syrian state, Through Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its affiliated structures, Julani has consolidated control over civil administration, internal security, and taxation, as detailed in a report by the International Crisis Group. His grip is maintained with Ankara’s protection, indirect funding, and political tolerance.
Turkey’s presence in Syria is deliberate and strategic. Turkish troops operate openly in Idlib. Turkish institutions, currency, and oversight dominate local life. Ankara doesn’t officially govern this enclave, but it effectively controls the area. It has made itself the gatekeeper of any diplomatic overture involving Syria’s northwest.
When Erdoğan pushes for Syria’s normalization with Israel, what he’s really offering is this Turkish-backed zone , a tactic consistent with his broader playbook from Libya to the Caucasus, where Turkish influence is projected through local proxies rather than formal annexation. For Israel and the West, this sets a dangerous precedent: empowering a non-state actor through a backdoor peace deal.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has privately warned that “any concession that empowers Ankara’s grip over Syria or compromises Israeli air superiority is unacceptable.” Israeli officials are lobbying Washington to block any deal that restores Turkey’s access to F‑35s — particularly if it legitimizes Julani’s fiefdom as a diplomatic partner.
The F‑35 isn’t just a fighter jet — it’s the core of allied military interoperability across NATO. Turkey was removed from the program in 2019 after acquiring Russia’s S‑400 missile system, a direct breach of alliance protocols. Re-admitting Ankara while it balances Western ties with authoritarian alignments in Moscow would be a serious risk to Western cohesion.
Meanwhile, legitimizing HTS — even by implication — rewards extremists with diplomacy. It normalizes territorial gains made by force, elevates non-state rule over sovereign representation, and risks encouraging other militant groups to seek legitimacy through proxy arrangements.
Julani has polished his image for Western journalists, but HTS remains a rigid Islamist movement with a violent pedigree. Any normalization process that includes them — even under Ankara’s influence — undermines the very foundation of the Abraham Accords.
These Accords were built on formal diplomacy, mutual recognition, and shared security goals. Allowing this deal to proceed would debase the currency of normalization. A backroom arrangement involving Erdoğan and a former al-Qaeda affiliate does not expand the framework — it dilutes it.
This isn’t to say Syria must remain permanently excluded. But meaningful normalization must involve legitimate, internationally recognized actors — not enclaves run by proxies with opaque loyalties. Idlib under Julani does not meet that standard.
The U.S. must reject any arrangement that trades strategic capability for symbolic gain. Erdoğan is an unpredictable partner — sometimes useful, often destabilizing. Rewarding him now, with no assurances or accountability, invites deeper instability.
Israel’s opposition is not rhetorical — it’s grounded in experience. The Accords have succeeded because they’ve prioritized clear rules, legitimate actors, and transparent state-to-state diplomacy. Turning them into a mechanism for appeasement would threaten their credibility.
Restoring Turkey to the F‑35 program in exchange for a questionable Syrian peace deal risks compromising both military security and diplomatic integrity.
Washington must distinguish real progress from political theater — and avoid mistaking a calculated maneuver for meaningful peace.
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