Although I retired from government service in 2018, I still stay in touch with many friends I made while working in the nuclear weapons community. One of them routinely shares articles of interest across the broad spectrum of nuclear security topics. This morning he shared a recent think tank study entitled “Comparing Allied Public Confidence in U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence.” The title itself is arresting, and the study itself even more so. Focused primarily on public attitudes in South Korea, the study notes that opinion surveys in South Korea depict “a lack of public confidence in current U.S. nuclear assurance” and “strong support for both the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons” to South Korea, as well as strong support for “acquisition of an independent nuclear weapons capability.”

This comes despite Biden administration promises to “strengthen its extended nuclear deterrence commitment” to South Korea, an initiative clearly aimed at discouraging South Korea from pursuing its own weapons. Put very simply, the people of South Korea, faced with an unstable nuclear regime only miles from Seoul across the DMZ, no longer believe that the U.S. offers meaningful deterrent protection against a North Korean nuclear strike.

Once upon a time, belief in the U.S. nuclear “umbrella” came easily. We’d stationed B61 nuclear bombs with the U.S. Air Force in Korea, after all. More to the point, the U.S. homeland was well out of range of Kim Jong Un’s nuclear-tipped missiles. But while estimates vary, the largest of North Korea’s Hwasong series of ICBMs appear apparently have the range to hit targets throughout the U.S. mainland. Furthermore, in return for assisting Russia in its war with Ukraine, North Korea may be receiving even more advanced weapons technology from Vladimir Putin. (READ MORE from James H. McGee: We Ignore Africa at Our Own Peril)

Moreover, South Koreans are also perfectly aware — it’s their neighborhood, after all — that China is aggressively pursuing an enhanced nuclear arsenal, one that, on its current pace, could meet or even exceed the power of the U.S. nuclear arsenal by the mid-2030s. Already, China’s nuclear arsenal challenges the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella covering South Korea. The same might be said of Japan, where once the notion of acquiring nuclear weapons was unimaginable, something that is now no longer the case. We can no longer provide even modest diplomatic and military support for Israel for fear of offending a pro-Hamas electoral constituency in Michigan. Who would be surprised if an American president chose not to risk Dallas or Denver for Seoul or Tokyo?

Creating an independent nuclear deterrent is well within South Korea’s current scientific and technical capabilities. And while the political barriers for Japan remain immense, Japan also possesses the technical ability to become a nuclear power in very short order. This could come quickly if the Japanese public should decide that a nuclear deterrent would prevent a future Hiroshima at the hands of Xi or Kim — or Putin. It’s not incidental that former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe opened the discussion of nuclear weapons after Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling in Ukraine. The Japanese are perfectly aware that they have their own potential conflict with Putin’s territorial ambitions regarding possession of the Kurile islands.

And herein, perhaps, lies the key to the changing world of nuclear deterrence. Regardless of how one assesses the credibility of Putin’s insistence that his nuclear options are very much on the table, the context of this discussion matters deeply. During the Cold War, the entire structure of nuclear deterrence hinged on the notion of a nuclear balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, a context in which the U.K., France, and China were seen as “bit players” even within their own respective defense communities.

Mutual assured destruction meant that a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be a war fought with conventional forces. The tactical nuclear weapons held by both sides largely represented an escalation “fence.” Despite multiple scenarios envisioning the use of a frankly dizzying array of tactical weapons, the most realistic scenarios saw a single use as an existential shock to the system, to be followed by negotiations to end the conflict. tactical nuclear weapons represented both an existential last resort when one side came to fear decisively losing the conventional battle. This continues to be reflected in Russian military policy, notably in the 2010 Russian military doctrine, which provides the underpinning for Putin’s “escalate to de-escalate” concept.

Now things look very different, whether viewed from Seoul or Berlin. Much has been made, particularly by the usual crop of NATO and EU functionaries of Donald Trump’s apparent unwillingness to commit to the future defense in Europe. These, however, are largely the same center-left “Eurocrats” who, eager to maintain their Davos bona fides, studiously ignored his more nuanced discussions of the same subject during his presidency. Moreover, only last week, Trump emphatically stated that he would fully defend those NATO allies that spend 2 percent of GDP on defense, and explained that his message to the others is meant simply as a challenge to get their defense houses in order. The extent to which European leaders insist on depicting Trump as a danger to European security, ironically, has enormously complicated the good relations that would be necessary if Trump becomes president again in 2024.

But of greater relevance to the evolving debate on nuclear deterrence has been ham-handedness on the part of the Biden administration. If one pays attention to the evolving debate within Europe concerning nuclear weapons, and ignores the polite diplomatic pieties uttered by European leaders in their discussions with the U.S, one finds that trust in the U.S.-provided NATO nuclear umbrella has deeply eroded. (READ MORE: Biden’s Gaza Pier Is ‘Black Hawk Down’ All Over Again)

Contra the more technically focused discussions within the trans-Atlantic nuclear community, this has less to do with where B61 gravity nuclear bombs might be located, and more to steadily declining confidence in U.S. political leadership. The botched Afghanistan withdrawal, the hot and cold support for Ukraine, the apparent willingness to throw Israel under the bus of Michigan electoral politics have all undermined confidence in U.S. strategic reliability. Increasingly, neither our potential enemies nor our most steadfast friends believe that the U.S. nuclear deterrent extends beyond protecting the U.S. homeland. Yet it’s precisely this belief, long-held and assiduously promoted by generations of U.S. policy makers, that has served as the underpinning for nuclear non-proliferation.

Now the entire non-proliferation regime appears increasingly shopworn, if not yet completely threadbare. Going back to the Clinton administration, we did nothing meaningful to discourage North Korea from becoming an increasingly dangerous nuclear power. Much the same may be said of Iran, and of the contemptible obfuscation of Obama’s nuclear “deal.”  We tell ourselves that Iran doesn’t yet have nuclear weapons, while knowing that this could happen at any time, particularly as the mullahs cozy up to Putin.

But now even our friends are exploring development of nuclear deterrent capabilities. Germany once viewed  the acquisition of nuclear weapons as wholly unacceptable, even with the fig-leaf of the so-called “Euro-bomb.” While this still remains controversial within the fraught world of current German politics, “Germany” and “nuclear weapons” are now being openly and more favorably discussed.

Poland represents another NATO nation increasingly open to acquiring nuclear weapons. This came first as a desire that U.S. B61s be forward deployed to Poland, under U.S. control but with the development of “dual use” capabilities for Poland’s combat aircraft (that is, the ability to carry either conventional or nuclear bombs). But discussion of a possible “Polish bomb” has also begun, and with Poland’s increasing investment in a technically sophisticated defense industry, this is a far from fanciful prospect, particularly if the Poles lose confidence in U.S. nuclear protection. While one can get quickly lost in the recent flurry of news stories surrounding Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski’s remarks during his U.S. visit, significantly, he didn’t rule out Poland’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Sweden — yes, Sweden — once had a very highly developed nuclear weapons research program, consistent with the long-standing Swedish policy of making the country a well-armed “hedgehog” capable of deterring any potential adversary. Sweden then chose to abjure further nuclear weapons development and instead embraced the global non-proliferation regime. Now Sweden, however hesitantly, may be opening a discussion regarding the need for a nuclear deterrent. For now the Swedes seem content to have taken the baby step of placing themselves, through NATO, under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but as that umbrella becomes more obviously tattered, they have the technical capability to go nuclear in relatively short order.

Even Finland, one of the first signatories of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and long a vocal adherent of the “no nukes philosophy, now may be reconsidering its stance in light of Putin’s nuclear brinksmanship — the Finns, like the Poles, know something about being invaded by Russia while the rest of the world sits on its hands. Like their Swedish neighbors, the Finns have, at most, taken only “baby steps” on the road to nuclear weapons openness. But given the departure point, even the most tentative consideration marks a considerable sea change.

All of this, of course, takes place against the backdrop of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, and the obvious irony that, after security assurances by the Clinton administration, Ukraine surrendered its inherited — a massive — nuclear arsenal. Given the diplomatic sweeteners we offered, that once looked very good to Kiev; now, it’s deeply regretted. If Ukraine survives as anything more than a complete Russian satrapy along the lines of Belarus, we can bet that the Ukrainians will find a path to acquiring nuclear weapons.

When it comes to extended nuclear deterrence, our potential enemies no longer fear us and our potential friends no longer trust us. The whole edifice of nuclear non-proliferation depended on this combination of fear and trust, which makes non-proliferation, much less nuclear disarmament the deadest of dead letters. Now, if there is a path forward for restoring the credibility of the U.S. nuclear “umbrella,” it surely must include greater attention to such things as anti-missile defense, along the lines first promoted by Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Sadly, progress in this field has been fitful at best, the result less of technical barriers than a persistent and regrettably bi-partisan lack of political will.

To their credit, the non-proliferation community at least got one thing right. In a world in which every Tom, Dick, and Houthi has the bomb, it will someday be used. Sometime, somewhere, it will be used. In a world filled with crazies, with fanatics who wish to impose their will upon all of us, no matter what the cost, the spread of nuclear weapons should be terrifying. For those of us who remember crawling under our school desks to “protect” us from nuclear attack, it’s a hard reality to contemplate. And as we look at our children, or grandchildren, or great-grandchildren, it’s profoundly sad, and, frankly, terrifying. (READ MORE: Keep an Eye on the Baltic)

Easter is upon us as I write these words. Amidst the solemnities of Good Friday and the joy of Easter morning, if you’re of a praying disposition, perhaps you might offer up a prayer that the next 9/11 won’t culminate in a mushroom cloud. Then we might all turn to the task of hiring leaders capable of mastering the challenges of a fraught and unstable nuclear world. The superficial thinkers and the faint of heart need not apply.

James H. McGee retired in 2018 after nearly four decades as a national security and counter-terrorism professional, working primarily in the nuclear security field. Since retiring, he’s begun a second career as a thriller writer. His 2022 novel, Letter of Reprisal, tells the tale of a desperate mission to destroy a Chinese bioweapon facility hidden in the heart of the central African conflict region, and a forthcoming sequel carries the Reprisal team from the hills of West Virginia to the forests of Belarus. You can find it on Amazon in both Kindle and paperback editions, and on Kindle Unlimited.