Among the least pressing problems facing Washington these days is what to do with all our neglected NeoCons now that Donald Trump has seized the Republican Party and decisively evicted them from their chosen home.  They are still rattling around the D.C. think tank world, with regular publications showing the world they are at least alive, if not thriving. Without the support of a party, they have become ideological orphans, ignored by the foreign policy apparatus. The Democrats don’t want them, both for the lingering odor of the Iraqi misadventure and the unwelcome reminder that the Democratic leadership took their counsel and supported it.  Where can the NeoCons peddle their policy wares now that Washington has little use for them?

A reasonable answer must first consider what are those wares, exactly?  By 2006, the NeoCon “brand” had become so tarnished that the very label became obscured by opprobrium just short of the “fascism” curse bandied about by progressives today. Before that dark chapter though, the term derived from a discrete set of policy axioms residing not far outside the broad historical spectrum of U.S. foreign policy. Foremost, that the assertive use of American military power could stabilize the world in terms favorable to the Western liberal democracies. Second, that liberal democracy is a system applicable to a wide variety of the world’s polities, and U.S. power could inculcate it in these places. And finally, that the United States had a unique responsibility to both manage the international system and to bear a disproportionate cost for maintaining its primacy.

In sum, not much more than a vigorous retooling of the internationalism of John Kennedy or Woodrow Wilson. What gave these ideas renewed purchase on U.S. foreign policy was an overweening hubris derived from the First Gulf War. Over the opposition of the media, the anti-war activists, and a sizable number of Democrats, the NeoCons were vindicated by a smashing victory over Saddam Hussein in a mere 100 hours. The Clinton White House adopted the NeoCon project when it went to war against Slobodan Milosovic and his Serb henchmen without UN sanction. After American power prevailed in the Balkans, the NeoCons appeared securely ensconced in both parties. The next war to topple a dictator would certainly prove them right again. (READ MORE from Karl Pfefferkorn: The US and Gaza Mission Creep)

But it didn’t. The NeoCon project foundered on that next war and the ugly reality of post-war Iraq. Saddam was vanquished, but average Iraqis proved indifferent or violently hostile to their American liberators. U.S. military power proved highly effective at destroying a ruling regime, but woefully incapable of erecting a durable successor government. The experiment of governing post-war Iraq suggested that liberal democracy was not a universal governing paradigm, but rather a highly contingent phenomenon that emerged from unusual historical circumstances in the West. The NeoCons discovered to their dismay that Iraq in 2003 was not analogous to Germany in 1945. A NeoCon syllabus with a little less Francis Fukuyama and little more Max Weber might have saved the United States many lives and much treasure. Today, the aim of implanting democracy worldwide has been displaced by a weary acceptance of stable authoritarianism in its various shades of ferocity.

Where might the NeoCon project still resonate? Not in the U.S. Donald Trump in word and Joe Biden in deed have embarked on a protectionist project designed to insulate America from foreign competition, China and Europe alike. Economic populism is incompatible with the interventionist internationalism favored by the NeoCons and represents a profound renunciation of America’s leadership of the liberal free trade regime.

But there is one place where the NeoCon program could thrive, albeit under an assumed name with a limited scope. In Europe, and specifically Ukraine, the unique historical antecedents for liberal democracy do pertain. Ever since it came blinking out into the daylight as head of an independent state, the government in Kiev has suffered from spectacular levels of corruption and an electorate divided by language and loyalties. The war utterly transformed the country. It has made the campaign against corruption a matter of national survival, and has joined Western and Eastern Ukrainians in opposition to the Russian invaders. You could reasonably argue that Vladimir Putin is the father of a unified Ukrainian nation committed to liberal democracy and its attendant prosperity.

What Ukraine desperately needs is the support of a Europe committed to what can be quietly termed regional NeoCon principles, although we should politely attribute them to President Macron or perhaps Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. What they share is the belief that Europe has the power to save the Ukrainian state, through massive increases in military assistance, economic aid, and perhaps even intervention. Macron believes that the future of Europe depends on it. (READ MORE: The Heartbreak of the Brideshead Republicans)

Post-war liberal democracy is already the strong preference of the Ukrainian people, and the European Union is well-suited to encourage it, through extensive aid, and the governance requirements imposed on every candidate member.  The magic that the EU worked in Poland in the 1990’s can work again in Ukraine. There will be no better refutation of Putin’s imperial Russia than a Ukraine thriving and prosperous under EU tutelage and European protection. Europe is the natural regional counterweight to authoritarian Russia. It should assume the role of regional hegemon akin to the expansive global role the NeoCons proposed for America in the 1990’s.

Europe can secure Ukrainian independence if a mere fraction of its industrial capacity and military might are devoted to it. The limited regional scope of this interventionist moment grants it a far better chance of success than the global hubris touted by our own NeoCons not so long ago. Perhaps we could spare a few to help Brussels realize its destiny. They need the work.