While full details of the protocols between the United States and India have not yet emerged, it is clear that Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, triumphed at his trip to the United States.
Seldom has a head of state received so much pomp and circumstance during a state visit. Modi received a White House reception on the South Lawn with Revolutionary War–era costumes and fluted strains of “Yankee Doodle”; a splendidly kitted-out honor guard; the “Star Spangled Banner” and “Jana Gana Mana,” the Indian national anthem written by the Bengali Nobel Prize in Literature recipient Rabindranath Tagore; thousands of cheering Indians of the diaspora; and a state dinner as well as a private one hosted by President Joe Biden and First Lady Jill Biden. He also delivered an address to Congress. It doesn’t get much better.
In New Delhi shortly prior to the visit, Modi lauded the relationship between India and the U.S. and said that there was “unprecedented trust” between the two heads of state. Modi also emphasized defense collaboration as well as opportunities in trade, supply-chain security, technology, and energy.
India Reaps the Rewards of Modi’s Visit
As reported by the Hindustan Times, a leading development will be the manufacture of F-18 jet engines for the Indian Air Force’s light combat aircraft in a joint operation between Hindustan Aeronautics and General Electric. Besides the Boeing F-18, these engines are deployed on Boeing’s electronic warfare Growler (a version of the F-18) and the Swedish Grippen. Local manufacture of such engines will enhance the Make in India policy of the Modi government, which was first outlined in 2014 as a national priority to stimulate the manufacturing sector. India needs to create 12 million non-farm jobs per year in order to absorb its new workers, according the McKinsey Global Institute.
Other favorable developments due to Modi’s visit include use of Indian naval facilities by the U.S. Navy, although a Logistics Support Agreement has been in place since 2017; the export of armed naval drones; an investment in Gujarat, India, by U.S. chipmaker Micron Technologies; more flexible H-1B visa regulations; and collaborative missions for space exploration.
The commitments and protocols arising from Modi’s visit are fundamentally a statement for the benefit of China, namely that India is a counterweight with U.S. support. New Delhi is increasingly concerned with China’s belligerence and the direct threat from three border incidents: Ladakh in the Kashmir region, the Doklam area of Bhutan adjacent to the Indian state of Sikkim, and most recently a clash on the Tibetan border with the Indian state of Arunachal last December.
What’s in It for Us?
Observers will read into Modi’s visit what they wish to. Biden and Modi both emphasized their nations’ shared democratic system and commitment to free markets. However, historically India has pursued its national interest independently, avoiding alignment with the West, as well as opposing the Chinese command and control model for Asia. India’s dependency on Russia for the importation of military equipment is well known — Russia is still the source of 45 percent of India’s arms imports. So the big payoff for the U.S. — getting India to pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin to end his war in Ukraine — has not been in the offing. Further, India’s purchases of Russian oil at discounted prices have been noted to support the Russian treasury.
Another issue of contention is the U.S.’s view of India’s record on human rights and the assessment that Hindutva, or Hindu nationalism, has marginalized certain communities in India, particularly through discrimination against Muslims, who comprise about 14 percent of India’s population of 1.4 billion. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has called out India from time to time and in April again affirmed that the U.S. was observing human rights abuses. (READ MORE: Indian Democracy Falters on Dark Path of Hindu Nationalism)
Modi certainly appears to have enhanced his stature in foreign affairs, and it seems he achieved his objectives. However, one must wonder what the United States gets out of it. The U.S. is not hankering to export drones or allow others to manufacture F-18 engines. Nor does the U.S. need a state visit from Modi to invest in Gujarat, relax visa requirements for Indians working here, or continue to collaborate in space.
India’s participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the U.S., Australia, and Japan since 2007 is reassuring, as is its participation in the similar maritime security exercise known as Malabar. However, India will not view Taiwan and the South China Sea as theaters where its national security is at risk: that judgment will be reserved for its 2,180-mile border with China and in the Indian Ocean, where navies of both countries operate to protect the oil sea lanes where roughly 80 percent of the world’s maritime oil moves.
In India, public opinion is skeptical of the West. Part of this stems from the colonial experience under the British Raj and the East India Company’s control prior to that. However, there is also the view that Western trade and investment since World War II and institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund are repressive instruments to assure domination by the West. Demonstrating wry irony, India’s minister of external affairs, S. Jaishankar, commented last year on the European view that India’s position on Ukraine could limit future support for India in a crisis: “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that its problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.”
India’s self-interest is situation-specific and is separate from its historical, cultural, and other affinities with the West. India is not about to jeopardize its strategic relationship with Russia or provoke China in order to please Washington. Henry John Temple, who was prime minister of Great Britain in the 19th century, said, “Nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests.” Indeed, our foreign policy establishment should not place unwarranted faith in shared values and should realize that India is a critically important transactional partner.
Frank Schell is a business strategy consultant and former senior vice president of the First National Bank of Chicago. He was a Lecturer at the Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago and is a contributor of opinion pieces to various journals.
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