India’s ontological question is: Who are we — a regional or global power?

Narendra Modi, the most popular and consequential leader of India since Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister after independence in 1947, can help answer this question. Modi’s approval rating was very recently reported to be 78 percent by Morning Consult, a Washington, D.C.–based firm specializing in survey research. (Other polls have shown approval ratings of at least 70 percent.)

On Modi’s watch, India has become the fifth-largest economy in the world, poised to become number three by 2030, surpassing Japan and Germany, according to the U.S. investment bank Morgan Stanley and S&P Global, the financial research and credit-rating agency. Besides being an information technology and software leader, India demonstrated its scientific prowess last August with the lunar landing of its spacecraft Chandrayaan-3. Under Modi, India is increasingly positioned as an alternative to China for foreign multinationals concerned with China’s belligerence, intimidation tactics, and rising political risk. 

Since independence, much of India’s politics has been opportunistic — affirming non-alignment yet being a member of the Soviet bloc and receiving its military, economic, and agricultural support. But over more recent decades, India has maintained a presence in two camps: a globally integrated trade and investment partner generally committed to the rule of law, and a major player in the Global South, defined by the U.N. as a group of generally low-income countries of Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia. 

In recent times, some of the heavyweights of the Global South have supported or tilted toward Russia in the Russia–Ukraine war, most notably India, China, Brazil, and South Africa, among the so-called BRIC countries. In view of its colonial history and the nonviolent philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi, India has had a platform of moral authority, which benefited others such as Indonesia in the postwar decolonization movement. 

India is now facing a dramatic choice, if it wants to make it: Is it a regional power or a global one? It can continue to opportunistically purchase discounted oil to benefit Russia’s war machine, as well as the Indian economy and competitiveness of exports, or it can use its stature in the Global South to seek peace in the Russia–Ukraine war, which has held the world hostage for two years. Few countries can prevail upon Vladimir Putin, but India has better odds than most, and applying diplomatic pressure to host talks should be on the table. 

In recent months, India has reduced reliance on Russian oil, although in 2023 Russia was India’s largest source of crude at 30 percent of such imports, which totaled $37 billion in 2023. The driving cause appears to be sanctions by the G7 and European Union rather than initiatives of India. Although Putin has dramatically increased the Russian defense budget for 2024, India’s oil import bill represented over half of Russia’s €63 billion defense budget for 2023.

India has indeed a difficult choice. The role of regional versus aspiring global player has been an issue for years. The national priorities of education, health, infrastructure, manufacturing, and agriculture demand a domestic agenda. While India’s global clout is undeniable, a leadership role as a global force implies certain responsibilities that could be at odds with resource allocation and national focus. Not only that, but Russia represents 45 percent of India’s arms imports, although that figure has declined in recent years. 

With a 4,000-mile border with Pakistan and China, with whom there is a history of conflict, India will continue to need to import military equipment. However, as Russia seeks to rebuild its military, improve the quality of its equipment and munitions, and deploy along an 800-mile border with Finland, its continuing reliability and strong support for supplying India should not be assumed. 

Assuming a landslide victory for Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the timing for outreach to Putin would be shortly thereafter. Offering to host a summit with the West and principals of the Russia–Ukraine conflict holds risk as well as potential promise. The main risk is a perception in India of capitulation to the West in a country that harbors some resentment of the U.S. and Europe and suspicion of their intentions. 

The upside is to position India as a moral force and influencer of nations, which could be parlayed into a stronger role in diplomacy, trade, and investment. Successful mediation could also earn a Nobel Peace Prize. And there is no one better to initiate an end to the conflict than a determined Indian nationalist and leading player of the Global South — one who can answer India’s ontological question.

Frank Schell is a business strategy consultant and former senior vice president of the First National Bank of Chicago. He was a lecturer at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago and is a contributor of opinion pieces to various journals.