Based on its last experience approving a new NATO member, it is no wonder that so many in Hungary’s conservative government have been wary about doing so again. Just a little over a week after Hungary gave the green light to Finland in late March, Finnish officials dealt a severe rebuke against Hungary, entering a European Commission lawsuit against Hungarian legislation aimed at limiting children’s exposure to LGBT content in schools and media. It was not exactly the thank you Hungary might have been anticipating.

At last month’s NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, Hungary indicated that it will give Sweden the go-ahead after twelve months of hesitation. The debacle with Finland might explain a lot as to why it took so much longer than nearly all other NATO members to do so. Though NATO accession has become massively popular among the historically-neutral Swedes since the escalation of the war in Ukraine last year, they have not exactly exercised prudence in winning Hungary’s favor. Turkey was the only other holdout on Swedish accession and its concerns regarding alleged Kurdish terrorists residing in Sweden and a recent Quran burning in Stockholm received more attention than Hungary’s. The Swedes, though, have also done plenty to upset the Hungarian government in recent years. (READ MORE: Hungary and the Nordic Countries: Five Ways the Darlings of the American Right and Left Might Not Be So Different After All)

Sweden too joined in the lawsuit against Hungary’s 2021 legislation on children’s exposure to LGBT content together with Finland and thirteen other EU countries. (The legislation, it is worth mentioning, bears a striking resemblance to Florida governor Ron DeSantis’ 2022 Parental Rights in Education law.) In 2019, Annika Strandhäll, Swedish minister for Health and Social Affairs and a member of the left-wing Social Democrat party, went so far as to draw comparisons between Hungary’s attempts to boost its stagnant birth rate and Nazi Germany. Budapest has not taken kindly to Sweden’s repeated accusations of democratic backsliding. Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Relations Zoltán Kovács argued this spring that Sweden is guilty of a “constant undermining of relations,” pointing out that Swedish politicians have called for blocking EU payments to Hungary, questioned the rule of law in Hungary, and showed little regard for a Hungarian delegation sent in early March to repair the relationship. The distrust between the two nations comes despite the fact that a right-wing coalition came to power in Sweden following last September’s election, in part boosted by the Sweden Democrats, a party some refer to as “far right.”

“We have no problems with criticism, it is part of democracy and how the European Union works,” says MP Zsolt Németh, Chairman of the Hungarian Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee. For him, the issue is with what he sees as dishonesty and hostile motives on the part of Sweden. “Certain Swedish politicians’… explicit aim was to incite the EU institutions to withdraw funds from Hungary and to directly interfere in our internal political affairs.” He explains that many of his colleagues in the conservative ruling Fidesz party came to doubt Sweden’s ability to treat Hungary as an equal ally. He cites a particularly troubling 2021 statement from current Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, at the time the leader of the center-right Moderate Party, that called on the EU to support the Hungarian opposition. Sweden acts, he says, “as if they were morally superior and as if Hungary was a colony.”

The rationale for Hungary’s actions does not seem to be quite as straightforward as mere discontent with Sweden’s attitude, however. While some Hungarian officials referenced such grievances, they also remained guarded in offering precise reasons for their hesitance.

Critics of Hungary — by no means in short supply in Western media since Prime Minister Viktor Orbán took the helm in 2010 — indicate that it amounted to an attempt on Hungary’s part to assert its voice on the international stage, showing the more influential countries it regularly tussles with that they must take Hungary seriously. Be that as it may, it is certainly true that Orbán’s outspoken style has increased Hungary’s international profile, making him and his country a polarizing presence in European politics. Some critics argue that Hungary aimed to use its vote as a bargaining chip to gain concessions. What they might have hoped to gain, however, is matter of speculation.

Unlike Turkey, which has pressured Sweden to address leniency with Kurdish separatists in Sweden, Hungary did not tie its decision to any clear demands. The fact that Hungary pledged in the runup to the Vilnius summit that it would approve Swedish accession if Turkey did the same means that it all but forfeited any pressure it might have been able to apply. That said, Sweden has notably not joined in calls from within the EU Parliament to strip Hungary of its scheduled term in presidency of the Council of the EU in 2024, a position that Sweden itself held this through June 30 of this year.

What are Hungary’s Objectives?

Even if there was no intent to induce a favor from Sweden, there are several potential benefits Hungary could have hoped to gain from its approach. For one, the affair could serve to strengthen its ties with Turkey. It is a relationship that Hungary has prioritized in recent years. In 2018, it achieved observer status in the Organization of Turkic States, where it refers to itself by the Turkish name “Macaristan.” It may serve as a display of solidarity with Turkey, showing Ankara that they have their back and will not leave them standing alone on the issue. As NATO begins to more seriously consider admitting Ukraine into the alliance, Hungary may be preparing for an even bigger showdown.

Hungary has been upset with what it sees as disrespect for the rights of Ukraine’s Hungarian minority community, escalating tensions between the two countries at a very sensitive time. Should Ukraine’s accession bid gain traction, Hungary would likely raise its concerns on those issues. Its stalling on Swedish accession could serve as a warning of its willingness to throw its weight around to do so. It could also be a largely symbolic gesture. It may have intended for Sweden, NATO, and the West in general to read between the lines. It is no secret that Hungary stands at odds ideologically with mainstream left-leaning governments in the EU and that it has positioned itself as an outlier on the war in Ukraine. Orbán proclaimed in February that Hungary and Vatican City are the only countries in Europe standing for a peaceful resolution to the war. (READ MORE: NATO Needs Ukraine, and So Do We)

Or perhaps the reasoning is much simpler than that. Hungary made efforts to emphasize its promise not to unnecessarily hold up the ratification process. According to Németh, Hungary has supported the idea of Swedish accession from early on. As there was some division within Fidesz on the issue, they sought to spend time building unity within the party before approval. Since Turkey continued to deliberate over its decision, he says, there was no rush.

Whatever Hungary’s goals in delaying Sweden’s accession, it was willing to pay a price to achieve them. In standing apart from the crowd, it has risked further damaging already strained relationships. If Hungary found itself on rocky ground with Stockholm before, the delay in approval did not help make it better. The ties with Sweden provide value to Hungary, its fleet of Swedish-made fighter jets being one example. Fellow EU members, who have shown a willingness in recent years to withhold EU funds from Hungary over disagreements, will interpret it as hindering NATO’s attempt to demonstrate a clear, united front in opposition to Russia. Some leaders in the United States have also been less than pleased. The Biden administration made Swedish accession a top priority going into last month’s NATO summit. Criticism from Democrats is par for the course, but Hungary also drew fire from Republicans, generally a friendlier crowd for Hungary’s right-wing leaders. In June, Congressman Bill Huizenga of Michigan declared in a House Foreign Affairs Committee meeting that Hungary and Turkey need to “come to their senses” on the issue. Senator Jim Risch of Idaho, the top-ranking Republican in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, recently blocked US shipments of over $700 million of military aid to Hungary over the issue and suggested that perhaps it is time to “review” Hungary and Turkey’s NATO membership.

Considering the risks involved, it seems clear that Budapest viewed this move as important. Its willingness to stick its neck out is certainly not out of character for Orbán’s style of governance. He shows no timidity in asserting Hungarian national interests as he sees them, even if it means becoming a lightning rod for left-wing critiques. The Hungarians have not backed down on the child protection law, despite intense backlash from abroad. They have remained adamant in their approach to the war in Ukraine, showing hesitance on Russian sanctions and calling for a diplomatic resolution to the war. Hungary has a habit of punching above its weight. There is perhaps no better analogy of this than its grand parliament building — among the largest in the world and completed in 1904 when Hungary was three times its current size — that looks like the capitol of a mighty empire, not a small, landlocked country of ten million people. Hungary speaking up loudly is nothing new. The only question is whether Sweden and NATO are listening.