Most people are familiar with Chinese finger cuffs. They make great party favors for kids. If you place your index fingers in them, it is very difficult to get out unless you know the trick. For the last six years, the United States Marine Corps has placed itself in Chinese finger cuffs of its own design, and it cannot figure out the trick to extracting itself.
In a recent article in the dissident unofficial Marine Corps publication “Compass Points,” retired General Tony Zinni points out the problem. Zinni is one of the most experienced and accomplished Marines of his generation, having directed complex combat and humanitarian missions as a joint commander. He argues that the current Marine Corps fixation with China is myopic and potentially fatal to the future of the Corps. He is absolutely correct.
Six years ago, the then-commandant decided on a radical restructuring of the Marine Corps from a worldwide force in readiness to a China-oriented missile-dependent defensive organization designed to place sensors and missiles on remote islands in the South China Sea with the intention of sniping at Chinese warships in the case of war. To afford the missiles and sensors, the Marines divested themselves of all of their tanks, heavy engineers, and many of the other capabilities that made it the nation’s most agile and ready middle-weight force. (RELATED: The Feather Merchants: Senior Leaders Subverted the Marine Corps)
The concept has been an unmitigated disaster. It has proved itself to be logistically infeasible, and its missiles are obsolete. The Army has a much more sustainable concept with vastly more capable hypersonic missiles. In addition, none of the nations in the region — with the exception of the Philippines — has signed on to the concept, and Manila will not allowed it to be used in a conflict over Taiwan which is the most likely war scenario. Worse still the regional commander has not even asked for such a capability. (RELATED: Some Generals Should Be Fired. Start With Eric Smith.)
Like Dorothy in The Wizard of Oz, there has always been a way back home. The generals have yet to click their ruby combat boots together to find it.
Meanwhile, the Marines have had to tell the national command authority on three occasions that they could not respond to regional contingencies elsewhere in the world because they had released the Navy from its commitment to keep the Marine Corps supplied with adequate ships to maintain a 24/7 presence in the world’s most likely trouble spots. Thinking active duty Marines realize that the Corps has put itself in a box, but the senior general officers have sold their souls to this Mammon called “Force Design” that they cannot easily walk away from without compromising their precious careers. But like Dorothy in The Wizard of Oz, there has always been a way back home. The generals have yet to click their ruby combat boots together to find it. (RELATED: The Marine Corps Has Gone Off the Rails)
Marine Corps Readiness Dilemma
Until 2019, the Marine Corps had a credible deterrent reaction force against China in the form of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) worth of Maritime Prepositioned Forces (MPF) in Guam and a Marine Corps Expeditionary Unit (MEU) that operated out of Okinawa. These capabilities could be quickly repositioned to the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, or any trouble spot where China is a threat. Their fixed-wing fighter/attack aircraft could use anti-ship missiles to do the same thing that the Force Design concept was designed to do, but from a safer distance. Instead of small, isolated platoons on the vulnerable islets in the South China Sea, the missile-carrying aircraft would be protected by a regiment-sized ground combat team with tanks and heavy engineering equipment to build bunkers and revetments for force protection.
This would have provided China with the assurance that any regional nation they threatened would have serious backing from the United States.
The Marine Corps gutted the MPF concept when it did away with the tanks, heavy engineers, and much of the field artillery that gave the MEB real combat power, and the lack of amphibious shipping meant that there was no assured transport for the MEU. This could be remedied in the near term in the region, but not without risk elsewhere. If the National Command Authority wants to place the Corps’ primary emphasis on China, what is left of the MPF capability could be concentrated in the Western Pacific.
The Army could be directed to provide tanks and heavy engineering equipment to augment the Indo-Pacific MEB until the Marine Corps could rebuild its tank and heavy engineer forces. The long-term adjustment to the Force Design concept would require canceling the contracts for the obsolete and unsustainable NEMSIS anti-ship missiles that the Marine Corps is currently buying, and would probably get a bunch of corrupt retired general officers working for the missile contractors fired — but that is happy collateral damage.
The commandant recently canceled plans to procure vertical launch Tomahawk cruise missiles due to their logistical infeasibility, and it would not be surprising to see the near-obsolete subsonic NEMSIS systems follow. However, it is not clear that this commandant has the moral courage to make that move. He is too invested in Force Design.
The Corps could quietly “adjust” the focus of Force Design away from missiles on remote islands while putting the primary emphasis on the renewed combined arms capability in the Pacific, which was lost in the Force Design debacle. This is a near-term fix. The return of the Corps to its full capability as a combined arms force, 24/7 global reaction, will likely take a decade once begun.
This near-term Indo-Pacific fix will not come without risk. The Marine Corps recently announced that it will devote two of its three MEUs to the Pacific. This will leave only one to cover the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf/Red Sea areas, and that is assuming that the Navy can keep enough ships ready to transport the requisite MEUs. That is very unlikely given the Navy’s abominable maintenance record. With Gaza still on fire in the Med and the Houthis acting up again in the Red Sea, we are taking a big chance.
Unfortunately, the Corps’ senior leadership will need some help in getting out of the Chinese finger cuff that it has gotten itself into. The current leadership lacks the wisdom and moral courage to quietly morph Force Design back to a balanced combined arms capability, even if they wanted to. The leadership to do this will have to come from the outside. Unfortunately, neither Congress nor the administration seems inclined to provide it.
READ MORE from Gary Anderson:
Deterrence Works in Schools Where Teachers Are Armed
The Feather Merchants: Senior Leaders Subverted the Marine Corps
On Iran, Trump Made the Only Decision Possible
We’ll Need Innovation to Fight China, But Will We Have it?
Gary Anderson retired as the chief of staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and served as a special advisor to the deputy secretary of defense. He recently retired as an adjunct professor at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.