People who have only experienced the highly polarized and often dysfunctional party system of today are often surprised to learn that a generation ago, the system was dramatically different.

The bitter partisanship and hostility that especially marks the House of Representatives (and, to a lesser extent, the United States Senate) simply did not exist 60 years ago. The overwhelming bias of both parties — toward the right among Republicans, the left among Democrats — is a modern phenomenon. There was a huge bias toward compromise in the old party structure because there were conservatives, moderates, and liberals in both parties.

Beginning with the 1938 elections, there was a substantial Republican recovery from the collapse brought on by the Great Depression and a rebellion among Southern Democrats against President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s more radical big government ideas. A conservative (largely but not entirely Southern) Democrat faction emerged that routinely allied with the Republicans. At the same time, Republicans had a large moderate wing and a strong presence in the Northeast and Midwest.

This conservative Democrat–Republican coalition was effective in the House and Senate for more than 30 years. The Eastern Republican establishment dominated the Republican presidential selection process from the nomination of Wendell Willkie in 1940 (largely engineered by Henry Luce and his Time–Life empire) through those of Thomas Dewey (1944 and 1948) and Dwight Eisenhower (1952 and 1956).

Vice President Richard Nixon reflected the balancing act in the GOP. He was committed to an international effort to contain the Soviet Union. He believed in gradually ending segregation and enforcing civil rights for all Americans, but he was fiercely anti-communist at home and committed to much more conservative and frugal fiscal policies than the Democrats. 

The Democrat Party in this era was a coalition of Southern conservatives, Northern liberals, big-city machines, and labor unions. The tensions between the conservative and liberal wings of the Democrat Party were, in many ways, greater than the tensions between Democrats and Republicans at the time.

Suddenly, by 1964, the moderate Republican domination of the Grand Old Party was shattered and replaced by a conservative force that remains dominant six decades later. It is important to study this shift (and its following political conventions) and the campaigns that led up to it. The revolutions in ideology in both parties were big. These changes shaped the political world in which we now operate.

Nixon Appeals to Republican Moderates

Three historic political conventions from 1964 through 1972 led to the rise of the modern system of conservative Republican Party versus left-wing Democrat Party. Amazingly, many of the issues that surfaced still lie at the heart of our current political struggle. But it started in the early 1960s.

Republicans created a new conservative center of gravity after the struggle of the 1964 Republican National Convention. The conservatives fully overthrew the moderate and liberal wings. But this rebellion against the moderate and liberal elements of the Republican Party began first with the rebellion of the conservatives at the 1960 Republican National Convention that nominated Vice President Richard Nixon. 

Nixon believed that he had the conservatives locked up. In the language of the moderate leadership of that day, “they had nowhere else to go, so you could count on them even if they were unhappy.” However, Nixon thought the race against Sen. John F. Kennedy would come down to attracting moderates, and even some liberals, away from support of the Massachusetts senator. Under President Eisenhower, the South had begun to open to the Republican Party. But the legacy of the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the power of established Democrat political machines meant that even a New England Catholic with moderate liberal credentials could carry some Southern states (JFK had beaten the far more liberal Hubert Humphrey for the nomination).

Furthermore, with Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson of Texas as Kennedy’s vice-presidential running mate, there was a real likelihood that Kennedy would carry several Southern states. In the end, Kennedy won 76 electoral votes in Texas and five Southern states, which was far more than the margin of his victory in the Electoral College (303 to 219 with 15 going to Southern conservative Harry Byrd). (READ MORE from Newt Gingrich: Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society Cripples America)

There were realistic grounds for Nixon’s efforts in the North. Eisenhower had won in 1952 with 442 electoral votes and then expanded his majority in 1956 with 457 electoral votes. In both elections, Eisenhower swept the North. Ironically, Adlai Stevenson, his more liberal opponent, mostly carried Southern states, which voted on partisanship rather than ideology.

So, from Nixon’s perspective, making sure the moderate and liberal Republicans were supportive was a key strategic decision. The most important liberal Republican of that era (and for the next 16 years) was New York Gov. Nelson Rockefeller.

Rockefeller Versus Goldwater

Rockefeller, with his enormous personal wealth and control of the largest state’s Republican Party, simply intimidated Nixon. He was an avowed liberal who believed in high taxes, big government, and aggressive affirmative action on race, and he had been openly critical of the GOP just before the 1960 convention. Nixon wanted to eliminate any possibility of a fight at the convention. In a show of weakness, Nixon asked to come see Rockefeller in New York. 

They met for hours and hammered out a 14-point program. Late that evening, they called the Republican platform committee, which would present to the full party committee the next morning for final approval. Nixon insisted that the 14 points be included in the platform. A soft military provision in the platform enraged President Eisenhower, who felt it challenged his policies. As a five-star general before becoming president, he was deeply offended by Rockefeller’s critique. That provision was dropped, but the others were added. At that point, the platform committee exploded over being dictated to. It took 36 hours of controversy to get them under control.

Conservative Republicans were livid. They saw Rockefeller as their mortal enemy (a perception that would become important in developing the conservative movement in 1961 to 1964). They were offended that Nixon, the presumptive nominee, would fly to New York and kiss Rockefeller’s ring. Their term for the agreement, the Treaty of Fifth Avenue, emphasized that it had been written in Rockefeller’s world. 

Conservative anger increased when Nixon chose Henry Cabot Lodge, a Massachusetts moderate deeply committed to the international effort to contain the Soviet Union (and a man who had lost his senate seat to Kennedy in 1952). On the platform and the ticket, Nixon had favored appeasing the Northeastern moderates rather than the Sunbelt and Southern conservatives. As a sign of how big the change in the center of gravity in the Republican Party, by 1968, Nixon was appealing to Strom Thurmond and conservatives to stick with him and defeat Rockefeller and Ronald Reagan at the national convention. The center of power moved that far in eight years. (READ MORE from Newt Gingrich: The Rise of Black Power and Widespread Violence)

As a protest, some conservative delegates nominated Arizona Sen. Barry Goldwater for vice president. Goldwater had published a 123-page book called The Conscience of a Conservative. In clear, understandable language it outlined what was wrong with big-government and left-wing thinking. It also outlined a vivid alternative in what would be called “commonsense conservatism.”  Goldwater had crisscrossed the country offering simple, clear conservative ideas since his election to the Senate in 1952. By 1960, he was the third-most-liked Republican leader after Eisenhower and Nixon.

However, when a rebellion began to break out at the 1960 convention, Goldwater rose and asked that his name be withdrawn. Despite that, 10 delegates supported Goldwater in a gesture of defiance. The fact that conservatives would turn to Goldwater was an omen for the future. When Nixon lost narrowly in the presidential election to Kennedy, the vacuum created an opportunity for conservatives to move to take over the party.

On Oct. 8, 1961, in Chicago, 22 people led by F. Clifton White met privately to discuss a draft Goldwater movement. White had led the national Young Republicans from 1950 to 1960. He was a superb technician who understood the mechanics of organization and the nuances of a 50-state campaign.

Goldwater was the symbol for a movement long before he was a candidate. Thousands of volunteers who organized for him began to change the fabric of power in the Republican Party. Goldwater-ism was much bigger and more powerful than Goldwater; he was merely the first in a series of leaders whose candidacies reflected a much deeper movement among the American people. Reagan would be next, followed by the Contract with America in 1994, the Tea Party movement in 2010, and the rise of Donald Trump and Make America Great Again in 2016. A steady line of emotion, belief, anger, and commitment runs through this 60-year cycle. 

As I wrote in my latest book, March to the Majority, a good friend of mine who played a major role in the draft Goldwater movement was Howard “Bo” Callaway of Georgia. He was a West Point graduate who served in the Korean War and was heir to a major textile fortune. An idealist who knew little about politics when he was recruited to help nominate and elect Goldwater, he told me years later that he was so naive he thought, like a good businessman, that you were supposed to deliver what you promised. As a result, he was one of the few state chairmen who met their financial goals for the campaign, and he was chosen to join a small group that would accompany Goldwater to the podium for his acceptance speech in San Francisco.

By February 1963, enough groundwork had been developed that they could launch the Draft Goldwater Committee. Goldwater did not approve, but he also did not stop them. Because White was an organizational genius — and he recruited similarly effective organizers — the movement grew rapidly. There was a large base of business owners, retired military, conservative women, and anti-government young entrepreneurs willing to go all out to turn “Conscience of a Conservative” from a book into a governing program.

Rockefeller Weakens, Goldwater Rises

While conservatives were rallying around the concept of drafting Goldwater, there was a remarkable development shattering the historically dominant moderate-liberal wing of the GOP. The dual emergence of the Goldwater movement and the chaos that was about to engulf the Republican establishment made this radical shift possible.

Rockefeller was rich, and the Rockefeller family was extraordinarily rich. Standard Oil, the Chase Manhattan Bank, and huge real estate holdings made the Rockefellers one of the great families of the U.S.

Rockefeller had the ambition to govern and the resources to mount huge campaigns. He came from far behind to win the governorship of New York in 1958. The scale of resources and the level of talent he could hire simply put him in a different league. After intimidating Nixon into the Treaty of Fifth Avenue on behalf of liberal and internationalist values, Rockefeller decided that he would run in 1964. His personal life, however, would create an opening for change. Before running, he was determined to divorce Mary Rockefeller, his wife of 30 years and the mother of his five children. This was an era when divorce among public officials was unusual and not wholly acceptable.

Adding to controversy, a year later, Rockefeller married Margaretta, or Happy, who had been previously married for 14 years and had four children. This remarriage to a woman who had a complex custody relationship with her children really jarred the American people.

By late May 1963, Gallup was reporting that Goldwater had jumped from 26 percent support to 35 percent, while Rockefeller had dropped from 43 percent to 30 percent. Rockefeller had the additional burden of being a big government liberal. He raised taxes, massively increased the state budget, aggressively supported of civil rights, and championed a strong American commitment to world affairs. These varying policy positions, plus his personal life, made it difficult for him to keep power in the establishment wing. Yet, as long as he was running, no other moderate Republican could really get in the race.

The Goldwater movement, meanwhile, kept growing, with a mass rally of 7,000 people in Washington, D.C., on July 4, 1963. Goldwater was not yet a candidate, but the draft was clearly building momentum.

As Theodore White wrote in his remarkable contemporary report The Making of the President 1964, “[The Goldwater] movement was something deep, a change or a reflection of change in American life that qualified as more than politics—it was history.”

Goldwater’s appeal was based on the clarity of his belief that he had to offer “a choice not an echo.” Goldwater was vividly aware that he was a prophet speaking out in a land that was in deep trouble. As he explained it at one primary stop:

When you say to some bureaucrat in Washington—“You take care of the kids’ education” when they say to you, “Don’t worry about Mom and Pop, don’t lay aside any money, enjoy yourself, the Federal Government will take care of Mom and Pop”—then this is the ultimate destruction of the American family. When this happens, Communism will have won.

His clarity thrilled his supporters and frightened the rest.

Republican War of the Delegates

In the first great test, the New Hampshire primary, another detour disrupted the ambitions of both Rockefeller and Goldwater. The traditional conservatives of that state were put off by Goldwater’s aggressive anti-government conservatism and Rockefeller’s liberalism and personal life.

When enough voters are unhappy with their choices, they often create a new one. In this case, a band of four volunteers from Massachusetts ran a direct mail campaign to draft Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. as a write-in candidate. Lodge, a former senator from Massachusetts, was a veteran of World War II, Eisenhower’s former ambassador to the United Nations, Nixon’s vice-presidential nominee, and, now, Johnson’s ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam. He was an attractive alternative for those who didn’t want to be forced to vote for Goldwater or Rockefeller. Lodge earned 33,000 write-in votes to Goldwater’s 20,700 votes, Rockefeller’s 19,500 votes, and Nixon’s 15,600 write-in votes. The race was clearly muddled with no clear front-runner; Lodge had a brief period of excitement but then gradually began to fade. 

This was an era when there were few primaries that really mattered. The next big contest was Oregon, and that was Rockefeller country. Rockefeller had begun to hammer on Goldwater as an extremist. In the more moderate state of Oregon, it worked. Rockefeller came in first with 93,000 votes, then Lodge with 78,000, Goldwater with 50,000, and Nixon with 48,000. (Note that Nixon, as a non-candidate with no organization, continued to have a significant base. This would become important in 1968.) 

The problem for the establishment wing was that all the focus on the public polls and the primaries missed the huge continuing growth of delegates gathered by the grassroots Goldwater organization. In state after state, the volunteers had been working for three years. They were winning the conventions that chose delegates in most of the country. 

While Goldwater had a huge lead in delegates, he knew that he had to win a major primary to prove he could attract votes beyond the base. The decisive battleground he chose was California. Before winning the Oregon primary, Rockefeller never received more than 31 percent of the vote in any California poll. After winning in the neighboring state, he jumped to a 47-percent-to-39-percent lead over Goldwater. California ultimately was a fight between Goldwater volunteers, especially in the Los Angeles, Orange County, and San Diego conservative bases, and the more liberal Republicans of the Bay Area and sheer weight of Rockefeller’s money.

It is possible Rockefeller would have won in California. However, on the Saturday before the primary, his new wife Happy gave birth to a son. The picture of the happy father holding the baby dominated news coverage in California for two days before the primary. This resurfaced all the taboos around his relationships and may have struck the final blow to his candidacy. When Californians voted on June 2, it was 1.1 million voters for Goldwater and 1.05 million for Rockefeller.

Labeled an Extremist

Goldwater’s lead was now almost insurmountable. There was a flurry of desperation among the moderate and liberal Republican governors, but they could not settle on who should replace Rockefeller as the alternative to Goldwater. After a near farcical series of meetings and maneuvers, they finally convinced Pennsylvania Gov. Bill Scranton to announce for president. By then it was too late: The Goldwater movement had turned into the Goldwater campaign. It sewed up so many delegates who were dedicated Goldwater conservatives that there was no possibility of stopping him. 

But Rockefeller and the other liberal Republican governors were successful in defining Goldwater as an extremist who was unacceptable to a lot of Republicans. Goldwater was described by leading members of his own party as the man who would destroy Social Security, potentially start a nuclear war, and (after Goldwater voted against the 1964 Civil Rights Act) lead the Republican Party to become the party of racists. These were not attacks by Lyndon Johnson and the Democrats. They were attacks from Republicans. And they were that much more believable to independents and moderates in the GOP — however untrue they were.

The Republican National Convention at the Cow Palace in San Francisco in 1964 was the fulcrum on which the center of gravity of the Republican Party changed. As Theodore White described it, “The Convention of the Republicans in San Francisco was a pivot in history.”

In a series of speeches and intense demonstrations, the new aggressive conservatism came into its own. As a sign of how much the Goldwater movement reflected something big developing among the American people, consider these words from Eisenhower. He told the delegates:

Let us not be guilty of maudlin sympathy for the criminal who, roaming the streets with switchblade knife and illegal firearms seeking a helpless prey, suddenly becomes upon apprehension a poor, underprivileged person who counts upon the compassion of our society and the laxness or weaknesses of too many courts to forgive his offense.

Eisenhower, as well as Goldwater, was touching on themes that still resonate 60 years later. The change had begun. As White put it, “this was a new thing in American conventions—not a meeting, not a clash, but a coup d’état.” He went on say that Goldwater “was to carve a forever unerasable mark on the thinking of the country.”

In his acceptance speech, Goldwater described principles that resonate to this day:

It is the cause of Republicanism to ensure that power remains in the hands of the people. And, so help us God, that is exactly what a Republican president will do with the help of a Republican Congress.

It is … the cause of Republicanism to remind ourselves, and the world, that only the strong can remain free, that only the strong can keep the peace!

Goldwater’s close, a deliberate challenge to his critics, was the most remembered part of his speech: “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice!… Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!” 

To underline how much the American people have been trapped for six decades in the same fight, consider White’s analysis: 

The American government is, to a large extent, stone-hardened in fossil structures and fossil theories that descend to it from the days of the New Deal emergency thirty years ago, too many of which have outlived their usefulness and hinder, rather than help, the bursting new society Americans have made.

While White was a liberal, his judgement as a professional reporter and historian forced him to conclude presciently that “one cannot dismiss Goldwater as a man without meaning in American history.… History must record that Goldwater was the first to bring this quality of life into political discussion.”

And yet as much as I admire White and respect his intuitive understanding of politics, he failed to cover Goldwater’s most important contribution to the future of American conservatism: On Oct. 27, 1964, the Goldwater campaign paid for 30 minutes of national television to broadcast Reagan’s “A Time for Choosing.” This video must be seen to understand its real power. Here, after all the attacks on Goldwater as an extremist, was a pleasant, cheerful, well-known movie star outlining the values that have now, for 60 years, remained at the heart of the conservative movement.

This speech hit home, raising more than $100,000 — a lot for that era. It also established Reagan as a serious national figure. As the premier political reporter of his generation, David Broder of the Washington Post, wrote, it was “the most successful national political debut since William Jennings Bryan electrified the 1896 Democratic Convention with his ‘Cross of Gold’ speech.”

The Goldwater movement had established the power of conservative voters, the legitimacy of conservative ideas, and the goal of replacing the centralized welfare state and its bureaucracies. President Johnson won the election, but Goldwater may have won the future.

This is the tenth installment in a series by Speaker Gingrich on American despotism. Listen to The American Spectator’s exclusive interview with the Speaker here. Find the first in the series here, the second here, the third here, the fourth here, the fifth here, the sixth here, the seventh here, the eighth here, and the nineth here. For more commentary, visit Gingrich360.com.