Three weeks have elapsed since a military junta ejected the democratically elected president of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, from power. Much has been said in many capitals; little has been done. This, frankly, is unsurprising since the U.S. and France, the Western countries with the most prominent stake in the presidency, have a weak hand to play. At first, those African neighbors who supported Bazoum, chiefly Nigeria and a number of the other ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) members, made loud noises about military intervention to restore Bazoum to power, only to conclude that their real military options were limited. 

The coup appears to have been popular within Niger, and the new junta has received encouragement from other West African countries — Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea — which, like Niger, are governed by coup-installed military juntas. The new junta has drawn praise from Russia, and an enthusiastic endorsement from, as one might have guessed, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group.

The Unforeseen Niger Coup

Although I try to follow African developments carefully, I confess that the Niger coup caught me off-guard. In my defense, I can only note that it also caught the U.S. government completely off-guard as well — and unlike the government, I have neither an embassy in Niamey, the capital, nor do I have the CIA or a USAF drone air base near Agadez, Niger’s fifth largest city. 

One might think that these capabilities meant that Washington would have seen this coming, particularly since we’ve invested a fair amount of political capital in the deposed president, Bazoum. However, as documented in an in-depth story from NBC News, just “hours before the recent coup in Niger, American diplomats painted a picture of a democratic government that, while imperfect, was more stable than others in the region. In fairness, the French, with an even more developed presence and history in Niger, also seem to have missed the coup’s coming.

In the near term, there seems there is little to be done. We can withhold aid, but in doing so we deprive ourselves of what little leverage we have, and we open the door wider to Russian or Chinese mischief-making. The nations of ECOWAS made loud noises in the early days about enforcing the African Union’s formal position against “unconstitutional changes” in government. But after reviewing their actual options — and discovering themselves more divided than at first thought — have retreated into a posture of simply expressing disapproval. The French are handicapped by both post-colonial tensions with a former colony, and by the perception that France is only interested in Niger’s significant uranium resources.

The temptation for policymakers in D.C. will be to simply “write off” Niger, in more or less the same manner as we’ve effectively written off Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea following coups in these countries. Indeed, even a cursory read across the news coverage of the last several weeks suggests an exasperation with the entire region, along with a fear of getting drawn into a “thankless” military involvement — a matter of even greater moment as the Biden Administration looks forward to the 2024 presidential election. 

America’s One-Paragraph Africa Strategy

Moreover, Niger is already in bad odor in that regard, following the 2017 ISIS ambush in which four U.S. Special Forces operators were killed. The French already fear that if they take a strong stance against the new junta, our administration will either fail to support them or, worse, actively undercut them. A recent article in Le Figaro, one of France’s three most important daily newspapers, spoke to a fear of being “double-crossed” by the U.S. administration. And lest one miss the point of the article’s title, the opening sentence reads, “With allies like this, who needs enemies.”

Given our track record, both recently in the case of the Afghanistan withdrawal and, perhaps more pertinently, in the aftermath of the “Black Hawk Down” incident in Somalia in 1993, there is every reason to fear that we might just wring our hands and walk away. We’re quite a ways down that path already. The NBC News story quotes an unnamed U.S. defense official as observing, “The entire National Defense Strategy for the U.S. includes exactly one paragraph about Africa. That tells you how much we prioritize the continent.” 

In a previous article for The American Spectator, I carefully noted the existence of African success stories and the potential found in states on the cusp of developmental success. But I also outlined the continuing problem of failed and potentially failing states. The coup in Niger represents a failure of democracy, but it’s too early to tell if it also portends a larger collapse. We should be on guard against viewing Niger as a failed state, even as we navigate a fraught relationship with the ousted president and the new junta.

Still, we should also be concerned about what comes next in our relationship with Niger. The U.S. involvement in Niger has largely been driven by our concerns with the expanding threat posed by the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel), the ISIS affiliate based primarily in the border triangle where Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger come together. But even this activity has been hamstrung by limitations placed on American military activity — enacted in response to the 2017 ambush that killed four U.S. special forces operators and four Nigerien soldiers. Ironically, our efforts to contain IS Sahel have involved working closely with some of the very same military leaders who now form the new ruling junta. 

So here we are again, as we’ve so often found ourselves in the past when it comes to matters African. In the near term, we have no good solutions to the situation in Niger or its equally challenged neighbors. There is no quick fix, no rabbit to be drawn out of the diplomatic — or military — hat. Let me repeat — there is no quick fix. What is required is a forward-looking strategy and sustained and consistent long-term effort. We can’t turn back time with Niger, but we can dedicate ourselves to ensuring that the conditions that led to the coup — and other recent coups — don’t continue to repeat themselves.

What Can Be Accomplished in Niger

The first order of business is simply paying attention. Our attention span concerning African issues has always been fleeting, tending toward non-existent. This won’t do. For most of Africa’s post-colonial history, we’ve outsourced our African policies to the continent’s former colonizers, chiefly the U.K. and France. To be sure, this has had some benefits. They have had interests, both economic and political, they’ve had ties to build upon, and they’ve had a cadre of personnel who knew the former colonies firsthand. But this has attenuated, to varying extents across the countries of the region, and comes fraught with resentments and a history of conflict. 

Ironically, Niger was one of the countries that seemed to be doing best in this regard — until, suddenly, it wasn’t. But if we wish to exert a positive influence in the region, we can’t simply piggyback on the French or the British. A basic tenet of NFL coaching wisdom is that a player’s most important ability is availability. A player may have all the talent in the world, but a propensity for injuries makes him largely worthless to the team. We have to be there, with the right people on the ground, supported by dedicated expertise back in the U.S.

Paying attention also means setting aside our political and cultural fantasies. For example, when Hollywood chooses to notice Africa, it tends to produce tendentious fantasies like 2022’s Woman King, a story based less on history than on American cultural fads. And we’ve developed a bad habit of lecturing Africans on our climate change efforts are, in effect, a form of developmental aid for them, something that will automatically make their lives better, if not now, then soon. We rarely bother to explain exactly how or when they will see the benefits. And the Africans notice this.

Put simply: We can’t listen attentively to them if we only want to hear ourselves talk. One of the most disturbing aspects of Russian penetration in Africa lies in Putin’s success in portraying himself as one who shares African cultural values, in contrast to the decadence of the U.S. and the EU. Not listening got us in trouble in Niger — we need to open our ears and close our mouths if we want to succeed.

We must also be honest with ourselves about the “security vs. democracy” balance. As Roger Kaplan observed in his recent article on the Niger coup, “The official policy of the U.S., France, and ECOWAS is that you cannot achieve security and prosperity without some degree of democracy.” Kaplan offers an excellent treatment of the overall “security vs. democracy” issue, as it now presents itself in Niger. After summarizing the critical role that Niger’s army has taken in fighting terrorism and promoting security in the region, Kaplan concludes, wisely, that “from our strategic perspective, Niger’s resourceful and courageous soldiers and the French should be on the same side — and the same page, to the degree possible.”

Security Above Democracy

We shouldn’t have to abandon our long-term commitment to democracy, but we might do well to set aside noisome lip service to democracy in the short term and focus on trying to find ways to harmonize each party’s interest in promoting security. This, not incidentally, might also serve as the best protection for President Bazoum and his supporters. Pushing Niger into civil war benefits no one.

Nor will we be able to solve the region’s most pressing long-term problem if we cannot find ways to bring these various parties together again. A demographic time bomb is exploding across the Sahel, and its concussive effects are already being felt in Europe — and increasingly in the U.S., as more African migrants turn up on the Rio Grande. Niger had served for many years as a major transit point for Africans making their way to Europe, converging on cities like Agadez on their way to Libya, and thence on boats across the Mediterranean.

Indeed, a subtext to the recent coup may have been the measures taken by the ousted president to cooperate with the EU countries to stem the flow of immigrants northward — people trafficking in Niger had become a lucrative business, indeed the most important source of income in the Agadez region. Cutting people trafficking has been a boon for Europe, but it hurt powerful, behind-the-scenes interests in Niger. The EU, led by the French, had used Niger as the pivot in efforts to cut off African migration at the source. And the Nigerien army has generally played a positive role. Now, with the key players at cross purposes, one can only wonder if the flows northward — some 170,000 as recently as 2016, will increase once again.

The outgoing flood of people from these regions is partly driven by poverty, partly by insecurity — and lack of security is a major driver of poverty — but above all, by a sense of hopelessness. Africans want better lives for themselves and their families, and if the long and dangerous trek to Europe offers the best opportunity, they will take it. 

Changing this dynamic means reversing the incentives. As thankless as the task may seem, we can’t achieve anything if we ignore the destabilizing effects of violence, corruption, overpopulation, and lack of economic opportunity. We don’t need to spend more on foreign aid and investment, but we certainly can do a better job of ensuring that it goes to those who need it most. Again, long-term success begins with listening rather than lecturing.

The Unseriousness of Liberal Border Policy

However, and contra our own “border czarina,” Kamala Harris, focusing on “root causes,” is only half the problem, and by far the least urgent half. The U.S. and the EU will achieve nothing substantial as long as our leaders remain committed to the notion of a borderless world and the free movement of peoples. The harm this brings to countries like France, Sweden, or the U.K. should be obvious. The harm to the countries from whence immigrants come is equally grave — if less well appreciated by our opinion makers. Only when the supposed “safety valve” of illegal immigration is turned off will countries currently being gutted by population loss be able to focus on development at home. Sadly, the very people who are willing to risk their lives on the arduous trek from the Sahel to Europe are often the very same brave and ambitious people their home countries need. 

It’s time for a paradigm shift. Africa needs substantial barriers to immigration and targeted in-country developmental assistance. Destroy the trafficking networks through aggressive international law enforcement. Make it clear that illegal arrivals will be turned away. In the European context, and directly analogous to “build the wall,” the boats must be stopped until they quit coming. The balance must shift, decisively, in the direction of staying at home and building opportunities there. But the hard work of developmental transformation in the Sahel can only begin when the fantasy of the European promised land is taken away — which, not incidentally, is precisely what many potential immigrants would actually prefer.

If this conclusion seems hopelessly altruistic, consider how little we’ve achieved by doing things the other way around. We’ve been at this since the end of the colonial era, the better part of seventy years, and we keep seeing the same results. Ultimately, we will only achieve lasting results by helping the peoples of Africa achieve their own goals rather than imposing ours.

James H. McGee retired in 2018 after nearly four decades as a national security and counter-terrorism professional, working primarily in the nuclear security field. Since retiring, he’s begun a second career as a thriller writer. His 2022 novel, Letter of Reprisal, tells the tale of a desperate mission to destroy a Chinese bioweapon facility hidden in the heart of the central African conflict region. You can find it on Amazon in Kindle and paperback editions and on Kindle Unlimited.