President Trump’s progress in efforts to end the Ukraine war made last week the most important of his second term so far. Trump initiated a previously nonexistent peace process, compelling both sides to consider difficult compromises and unifying Europe behind him.
However, there are two major obstacles to a peace agreement—territory swaps and security guarantees—that will require creative diplomacy by President Trump and his foreign policy team to resolve.
President Trump made significant strides in moving Putin to agree to a deal to end the war during a summit meeting in Alaska on August 15. Although Trump vowed to walk out of the summit and impose “severe consequences” on Russia if he determined Putin was not serious about ending the war, Trump called the summit a success, saying Putin showed sufficient willingness to pursue peace. Not only did Putin appear willing to make new concessions at the summit, but Trump also used it to help repair U.S.-Russia relations, which had deteriorated badly during the Biden administration.
Predictably, the liberal media and the American Left bashed President Trump over the Alaska Summit, claiming it was a failure that amounted to appeasement of Putin. This criticism was quickly disproved after Zelensky and seven European leaders rushed to Washington to consult with Trump on the summit and next steps to get a peace agreement. The European leaders expressed strong support for Trump’s peace efforts at the White House. Just as important, Zelensky exhibited a friendly and cooperative attitude with President Trump.
The Major Obstacles: Land Swaps and Security Guarantees
Land swaps and security guarantees are complex, overlapping issues that are the principal obstacles to a peace deal, assuming Putin actually wants to end the war and does not plan to stymie a settlement with other unreasonable demands.
Ukrainian leaders have adamantly rejected giving up land to end the war. Ukrainian President Zelensky has stated that the Ukrainian constitution prohibits this. However, there is a growing belief by Western leaders and experts that Ukraine will need to accept at least de facto Russian control of Ukrainian areas it has seized and may need to cede some territory to Russia as part of a peace agreement.
Putin reportedly suggested “land swaps” at the summit as part of a peace agreement. Putin proposes that Ukraine swap areas of the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine still outside Russian control. Russia has seized about 80% of this region but has been unable to take a heavily fortified area of the Donetsk province in the Donbas. Ukrainian officials regard this as an unacceptable concession because losing the fortified Donetsk region would make it easier for Russian forces to conquer vulnerable areas of the country beyond it.
Some unnamed U.S. officials suggested to reporters that Russia might swap the Russian-held Ukrainian cities of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson in exchange for the remainder of the Donbas region. Russian officials have not publicly confirmed this nor explained what territory Russia might swap.
In response to statements by Putin and other Russian officials before and after the Alaska Summit, it was suggested that Ukraine might cede or swap the Donbas area in exchange for the deployment of a robust security guarantee force. Responding to press questions about this idea this week, Zelensky signaled new flexibility on land swaps, saying this is “a very complex issue that cannot be separated from security guarantees for Ukraine.”
Unfortunately, confusion and unrealistic proposals have bogged down the security guarantees concept, making it a major obstacle to a peace agreement or cease-fire.
Since early 2024, several European leaders, notably UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron, have been calling for the deployment of a mostly European military force to Ukraine to secure a peace agreement or cease-fire. Troops would be provided by a group that calls itself “the Coalition of the Willing,” composed of 28 NATO members plus Australia, Ireland, and New Zealand.
The mandate for a security guarantee force and what to call it are unclear. It was first said that such a force would be similar to a lightly armed UN peacekeeping force monitoring a cease-fire and the Russia-Ukraine border. However, European leaders and many experts began in 2025 to refer to this mission as a peace enforcement force consisting of combat troops that would enforce a cease-fire.
The UK and France have also recently discussed a “reassurance force” of about 15,000 troops deployed in western Ukraine, far from the front lines.
There was a new twist on the peace enforcement idea when U.S. officials said Putin indicated at the Alaska Summit that he was willing to agree to security guarantees for Ukraine, implying that he would accept the deployment of some kind of security guarantee force. There were also claims by U.S. officials before and after the summit that an “Article 5-like” protection force was on the table at the summit. This was a reference to Article 5 in the NATO Charter, under which NATO members are obliged to consider an attack on one state as an attack on all and respond accordingly.
President Trump has ruled out U.S. ground troops participating in a security guarantee force in Ukraine but said the U.S. might provide air support, intelligence, and logistics.
Russian officials this week rejected the recent security guarantee proposals and offered an alternative that is not a viable option.
I was not surprised when Russian officials this week ruled out the deployment of European troops in Ukraine in any capacity to secure a cease-fire or peace agreement because of Putin’s paranoia of NATO troops in Ukraine. Moreover, because of Putin’s strong opposition to Ukraine joining NATO, a “NATO-light” arrangement giving Ukraine Article-5-like protection was also sure to be a non-starter for the Russian leader.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov this week said Russia rejected discussions of collective security guarantees negotiated without Russia and that Moscow would only accept a security guarantee arrangement similar to a 2022 plan to deploy troops from the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—China, Russia, the United States, Britain, and France. Under the 2022 plan, Russia would have a veto over any military response by the security guarantee force. Ukraine rejected this proposal in 2022. It is certain to be rejected again by Ukraine, Europe, and the U.S.
Alternatives to the Current Obstacles to a Peace Agreement
Because I did not think Putin would ever agree to allow European troops to deploy to Ukraine, I have long opposed the European security guarantee force proposals and instead called for deploying a lightly armed UN peacekeeping-like force composed of troops from neutral countries. Participating countries would be agreed to by Russia and Ukraine. Such a force would verify a cease-fire, work with both countries to resolve cease-fire violations, and serve as a tripwire to deter renewed Russian aggression.
This type of force has helped resolve other global conflicts, including in Cyprus, the Golan Heights, India/Pakistan, and Iraq/Iran. I believe if Putin is sincerely interested in peace, a force like this should be acceptable to him.
Ukrainian officials at this time probably will not accept a UN peacekeeping-like security guarantee force, nor will they agree to swap territory in exchange for such a force. Other steps will be needed to convince Ukraine to support this idea, including heavily arming the country with defensive weapons and rejecting Russian demands that would undermine its security and sovereignty, such as demilitarizing the country, barring foreign military aid, and meddling in the country’s internal affairs and governance. Even with such concessions and assurances, there would have to be a convincing demonstration by Russia that it plans to abide by a cease-fire.
Putin has other demands for a peace agreement. He wants Ukraine barred from NATO membership, which is not an issue at this time because this would require a unanimous vote by NATO members, and Hungary is certain to vote no. Putin also wants Ukraine to remain neutral and international legal recognition of its annexation of Crimea and four other regions it seized from Ukraine. I believe these issues are negotiable.
Convincing Ukraine to give up the territory it controls in the Donbas for a peace agreement will be a heavy lift without the deployment of a peace enforcement-like force, which Russia is sure to reject. A compromise might be possible by putting this territory under the control of a neutral force or the UN for a set period, after which its final disposition would be resolved at a future peace conference.
There are other obstacles to a peace agreement that Trump officials are trying to resolve. Putin is resisting Trump’s call for him to meet with Zelensky and instead wants to hold a lower-level bilateral meeting. Putin’s refusal to agree to this meeting and difficulty in finding a mutually agreed venue might require a third party to mediate this meeting, possibly the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed in Riyadh. President Trump also could convene a trilateral meeting, possibly in Alaska or Switzerland.
Putin’s acceleration of attacks against Ukraine after the Alaska Summit does not bode well for his willingness to agree to end the war. The BBC reported on August 21 that Russia launched 574 drones and 40 missiles on Ukraine, Russia’s heaviest attack in several weeks.
President Trump soon may inform Putin that his patience with him is running out and that unless the Russian leader agrees to meet with Zelensky and negotiate in good faith to end the war, he will impose energy sanctions against Russia and sell weapons to NATO to give to Ukraine. This will be followed by crippling economic sanctions, including seizing Russian financial assets worldwide and comprehensive sanctions against Russia’s central bank.
Trump is determined to stop the killing in Ukraine, and I believe he is prepared to make Russia pay a high price if there is no significant movement by Putin to end the war over the next few weeks.
Outlook
History shows that peace-making is difficult and that agreements to end wars usually come about after long, painstaking negotiations. Peace processes take time. There will be setbacks and reversals. Peace agreements also require dialogue. President Trump’s efforts to improve U.S. relations with Russia and establish regular dialogue have created the possibility for peace. It will take all of Trump’s dealmaking skills to convince Putin and Zelensky to make the hard compromises to reach a peace agreement.
Trump has acknowledged that, despite his best efforts, a peace agreement to end the war in Ukraine may not be possible. If this turns out to be the case, it will be President Biden’s failure—not Trump’s—because Biden’s incompetent foreign policy emboldened Putin to start this war and made it worse.
Whether President Trump succeeds in ending the Ukraine war or not, his high-risk diplomatic efforts have bolstered his reputation as a peacemaker and the leader of the free world. This leadership will help Trump promote global stability and enable him to solve other conflicts around the world.
Fred Fleitz previously served as National Security Council chief of staff, a CIA analyst, and a House Intelligence Committee staff member. He is the Vice Chair of the America First Policy Institute’s Center for American Security.