Red flags for energy security and stability in southern Africa are being ignored, but with 90% of all Islamic State (IS) terrorist attacks occurring in Africa and moving south, the risks to America are increasing significantly.
The US does not need military boots on the ground; it needs the FBI and intelligence services to act. Provide Mozambique with intelligence, finance, arms, and training to stop IS from marching into South Africa. Cut off financial and arms supplies to IS, and use technology to help end the reign of crime and corruption in South Africa, as Mr. Johann Rupert, the SA billionaire, asked of President Trump in the White House in February 2025.
In a recent paper, Black Crescent: Islamic State in Africa, Free State University’s Professor Hussein Solomon points out that “IS now operates across the continent via its eight official wilayats (provinces) in Africa, including Central Africa Province, Greater Sahara Province, Libya Province, West Africa Province, Mozambique Province, and Sahel Province.”
Islamic insurgency in Africa has extended its reach down the continent, setting down roots as far south as northern Mozambique, halting the development of one of the largest gas fields in Africa, and forcing Exxon and TotalEnergies to declare force majeure. Mozambique may be a signpost pointing toward southern Africa, where the strategic prize of South Africa, an increasingly fragile large state, awaits.
As Mozambique shares a southern border with South Africa and the Kingdom of Eswatini, this southern flashpoint for jihadist terror should raise concerns about South Africa in view of its relationship with Iran, alarming corruption and crime rates, weak governance, and the incapable state of the South African military.
South Africa’s armed forces are weak, judging by their operational performance since 2013. Recall the Central African Republic (CAR) deployment in 2013: South African forces rushed in to defend Bangui, but without the support of adequate air or armored resources. Thirteen SA soldiers died before the SANDF eventually withdrew from CAR. In January 2025, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) suffered heavy losses and operational failures while deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where its peacekeepers were surrounded and unable to act effectively for lack of air support, ammunition, logistics, or even proper vehicles. The SANDF was also replaced by Rwanda in the fight against the Mozambican Jihadist insurgency after proving ineffective.
South Africa’s close military relationship with Russia, China, and Iran became disturbing in mid-August 2025, when SANDF chief General Rudzani Maphwanya made public statements of solidarity with Iran during a visit to the main jihadist funder across the Middle East and Africa. The South African Presidency called the trip “ill-advised,” noting that the general was not authorized to represent South Africa’s foreign policy. The SA Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) also stated that foreign policy remains the prerogative of the Presidency and itself, not the military. Opposition parties swiftly called for his court-martial, suggesting that the general had overstepped both constitutional and professional bounds. Nothing was done.
Another red flag flew in July 2024, when South African police raided a clandestine training camp on a farm near White River, Mpumalanga. Ninety-five Libyan nationals were arrested. Reportedly, there are under study visas, evidence suggests military-level training instead of guard duties. The camp’s layout, equipment, and unauthorized instructors violated the Foreign Military Assistance Act. Local authorities claimed to be investigating possible links to organized crime or extremist groups and whether other cells operate elsewhere. Nothing further has been heard since then.
Amidst political noise, the Mozambique Jihadist Insurgency continues advancing, threatening national and regional security. It may adversely affect international energy prices and is a humanitarian disaster for the region.
Islamic State-linked insurgents in Cabo Delgado displaced 46,000 people in just a week in July 2025, of whom around 60% are children. Exxon and TotalEnergies halted their $20 billion LNG operation in 2021 due to the insurgency. Though resumed operations are planned, security remains tenuous. Global analysts warn that LNG output delays could mean several million tons per annum lost, with the effect of tightening global markets and elevating prices.
The energy security threat should particularly alarm South Africans. Already, local oil-from-gas giant Sasol might have to curtail operations at its Secunda plant if it cannot replace the Mozambican gas supply, jeopardizing thousands of jobs. South Africa also imports roughly 10,800 GWh of electricity annually from Mozambique’s Cahora Bassa Dam. If this electricity supply is cut due to Jihadist terrorism, and the SANDF is unable to provide protection, South Africa’s electric grid will revert to ongoing power cuts.
“South Africa has emerged as the locus of IS funding for all its African franchises,” according to Professor Hussein. He writes that organized crime and corruption have widely infected South African society, enabling close ties between terror groups and organized crime syndicates, giving IS some comfort operating in South Africa, abetted by the general incompetence of South Africa’s security establishment.
Already threatening American energy assets in Mozambique, Islamic terrorism may yet become a disaster for America if South Africa becomes an IS captive state, threatening shipping around the Cape Coast and providing training, arms, and financing for IS attacks on American soil.
François Baird is a Distinguished Fellow at the Energy Policy Research Foundation (EPRINC), where he focuses on energy poverty in Africa.