The other day, while reading the details of the Trump Administration’s trade deal with Japan, I noticed something I thought was peculiar. Among other provisions on which the Japanese and American governments agreed was that the Japanese would purchase 100 jets from Boeing. Boeing, of course, is a publicly traded company, which is to say that it is “owned” by its millions of shareholders. Or to put it more bluntly, Boeing is not owned by the American government. Yet here was Boeing playing a key role in a major trade agreement between two of the largest economies in the world. As I said, peculiar.
Or so I thought.
As it turns out, it was not especially peculiar. Rather, it was perfectly typical. Boeing—and the purchase of its planes—also played a key role in the Trump Administration’s trade agreements with Great Britain and Indonesia. And according to some press accounts, Boeing will play a big part in trade agreements with China and India and has also been a critical cog in “economic cooperation” negotiations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Everywhere the Trump Administration is making deals, Boeing, it seems, is present.
Now, to be clear, it’s not like the countries in question here had much choice. There are only two manufacturers of wide-body aircraft in the world, Boeing and Airbus. Airlines in these countries have to buy from one of the two. Nevertheless, the inclusion of Boeing in official trade negotiations and announcements is interesting, to say the least.
For the record, Boeing is one of the largest private employers in the country. It is also the single largest American exporter, meaning that its success fits perfectly with Team Trump’s vision for the American economy in general and American trade specifically: more jobs, more exports, and lower trade deficits. Still, it is not a government entity—or at least it’s not supposed to be.
Some of the news coverage on Boeing and its role in the recent deals noted that Boeing has many issues to resolve before it can turn its trade prominence into real strength. As The New York Times put it, “Boeing has many pressing problems it still needs to address. The company is years behind securing regulatory approval for several important jets.” It is also years behind in the production of current orders and still has considerable lingering supply chain issues.
All of this is in addition to the company’s more pressing and well-publicized quality, safety, and public relations problems. Boeing planes were involved in major crashes in 2018 and 2019. In 2024, a door panel infamously fell off a Boeing plane mid-flight. Boeing aircraft have had “stuck pedals,” engines that flame, and landing gear tires that fall off after takeoff. Inspections have persistently revealed loose bolts in various important aircraft components.
Furthermore, the aircraft manufacturer has been a serious and unapologetic practitioner of DEI—Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion—which is to say that it has rewarded managers and other employees based not strictly on merit or performance criteria but on racial, gender, and sexual preference quotas. Beginning in 2022, Boeing changed its incentive plan from giving executives bonuses based on passenger safety, employee safety, and quality to rewarding them if they hit climate and DEI targets. In a filing with the SEC, the company wrote, “While our 2021 design incorporated operational performance in the areas of product safety, employee safety, and quality, for 2022 we will add two other focus areas critical to our long-range business plan: climate and diversity, equity, and inclusion (DE&l)…”
Given all of this, one would think that it makes no sense at all for the American government—the Trump administration in particular—to be partnered with Boeing in this or any other capacity.
Unfortunately, this is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Not only is the partnership between Boeing and the American government far older and far more profound than most observers would suspect, but it is also quite revealing. In the end, all of the above is interconnected. Nothing about this partnership is coincidental.
The first thing to note about this partnership is that it is bi-directional. In addition to being Boeing’s biggest cheerleader and most effective salesman, the American government is also the company’s biggest and most important customer. Over the past decade, Boeing’s Space, Defense, and Security sector has become its largest source of revenue, far surpassing its former largest revenue producer, commercial aircraft. And as with most defense contractors, those revenues have increased substantially in just the past couple of years, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
The second thing to note is that this partnership—whereby the American government purchases Boeing planes a part of its trade negotiations—dates back at least three decades. Just over thirty years ago, for example, negotiations between the Clinton Administration and the Chinese government about piracy and copyright protection almost fell apart when the CCP hinted that it just might buy its new planes from Airbus rather than Boeing. Selling Boeing’s planes to foreign governments has long been an American government priority.
The catch in all of this is that the partnership between Boeing and the government has enabled the former to escape the iron laws of markets. In a normal market setting, companies are forced by competition to produce quality goods at reasonable prices. Because of this partnership, however, Boeing hasn’t had to do so. It has been able to coast, growing fat and complacent, secure in the knowledge that its sales are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States Government. So, Boeing’s planes crash. So, its doors fall off. So, it produces a substandard product. So, it rewards employees for their skin color or sexual preference, rather than their competence. So… what? What’s anyone gonna do about it? With the American government buying half its industrial output and selling the rest, what does Boeing care?
The Trump administration may call its trade deal with Japan a “huge victory for America and its people.” Or it may call its deals with Indonesia and Great Britain “enormous testaments to the spirit of the American worker.” All of this is well and good, and some of it may even be true, but because of the prominent inclusion of Boeing in these trade deals, we can also call them something else, something far more destructive and foreboding: corporatism.
As many media accounts have noted, in the wake of these trade agreements, Boeing’s stock price has risen dramatically, recouping much of what was lost in the aftermath of the multiple 737 Max debacles. This share-price increase is not the result of improvements in corporate leadership, however, or product quality, or anything else that would normally signal that a company is a good buy. It is due exclusively to the hype surrounding the sales of Boeing’s planes to Japan, Indonesia, and half a dozen other countries—sales that were made by the Trump Administration. This may seem like a positive for shareholders in the short term, but in truth, it does them—and everyone else—a great disservice. It leads them to believe that Boeing is a far better company than it actually is and inflates its share price unjustifiably. In the long run, this will prove terrible for everyone, including Boeing and the American government.
The great irony here is that President Trump himself doesn’t seem to care much for Boeing and has criticized the company repeatedly. That’s how deeply ingrained in American foreign trade this corporatist relationship with Boeing has become. Even Trump can’t break it.
Ultimately, that’s a disaster—or several!—waiting to happen.