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Jun 24, 2025  |  
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Matt Rowe


NextImg:The dangerous assumptions of open-source secrecy

In military and intelligence circles, discretion is more than a matter of professionalism—it’s a matter of security. And yet, in today’s digital age, discretion is increasingly being replaced by assumption. Assumption that “everyone already knows.” Assumption that “our enemies have already figured it out.” These beliefs are not only unfounded but dangerously complacent.

I witnessed this firsthand. Years ago, I attended a highly classified, experimental training program in the U.S. Army. The level of secrecy was such that even among graduates, it was rarely discussed—an unspoken code respected by all. That is, until I stumbled into a Facebook group where individuals who had once honored that silence were now casually divulging details of the training.

Image created using ChatGPT.

When I pointed out that the program was classified, I was dismissed. “Our enemies already know what goes on there,” one person scoffed. But how did they know what our adversaries truly know? Where is the line between assumption and unauthorized disclosure?

This same mentality seems to be creeping into mainstream media and commentary. A recent Fox News opinion piece titled “Midnight Hammer: Mission Accomplished—But There’s One Big Red Flag” by Rebekah Koffler applauds the success of a U.S. airstrike on Iranian nuclear facilities—an operation reportedly executed by B-2 stealth bombers. The concern, she writes, is not the mission’s execution, but its implications for future conflicts: namely, the U.S. does not have enough B-2s to mount a sustained campaign against China. She points out that only 20 B-2s exist, with just half of them combat-ready at any given time.

Whether Koffler’s figures are accurate or not, the broader issue is clear: sensitive assessments about American military readiness—especially regarding near-peer adversaries like China—are now common fodder in national news and op-ed pages. While much of this information may be technically unclassified or open-source, the tone and context in which it’s presented often crosses into reckless territory. It blurs the line between informed analysis and strategic self-sabotage.

Assuming that our adversaries already know our vulnerabilities is not a justification for broadcasting them. That assumption gives bad actors the confirmation they need. While open-source intelligence (OSINT) is powerful, it becomes exponentially more valuable when validated by public commentary, especially from high-profile figures or reputable media platforms.

In the military, operational security (OPSEC) is a continuous discipline—not a switch flipped when convenient. The success of stealth platforms like the B-2 is due in no small part to the mystery that surrounds them: how they’re used, where they launch from, what tactics they employ. Casual references to limitations, fleet size, or readiness levels may seem benign—but they are precisely the types of gaps our adversaries seek to exploit.

We must ask ourselves: Are we upholding security through silence, or undermining it through arrogance? The belief that “everyone already knows” is not only lazy—it’s dangerous. Our enemies don’t need us to shout our weaknesses from the rooftops. But too often, we do it for them.