Nuclear weapons hold about the same position in modern military armament as bayonets. Both can kill you but, as working tools, neither has much present-day use in the tactical application of military power.
That has not always been the case since nuclear weapons settled the argument with Imperial Japan. The military problem in the Korean War was that Truman limited it politically and geographically (much to MacArthur’s regret). After initial maneuver warfare up and down the peninsula, the war devolved into massed Chinese troops launching infantry attacks on the key hills around the 38th parallel that American, South Korean, and other UN troops defended. Using their superior conventional firepower, the Americans would take a hilltop only to see the Chinese overwhelm it again.
President Eisenhower (former general that he was) showed how to blunt those mass attacks. He used a huge new field artillery piece to fire a 20 kiloton (kT) artillery shell into the Nevada desert. Before you can have a massed infantry attack, you must first mass your infantry, making them easy, out-in-the-open targets for a 20 kT artillery shell. He filmed the test and gave a copy to the Swedes to share with the Communists. The North Koreans promptly came to the negotiating table.
Nuclear test. Public domain.
In the Cold War in Europe, a Russian attack would require massed tank columns funneling through the Fulda Gap along the border of East and West Germany. Using conventional nuclear weapons would work (see the “Davy Crocket”) but the collateral damage to Europe was unacceptable to our NATO allies.
The US answer was “enhanced radiation weapons” (aka the neutron bomb.) Our weapon developers dialed back the blast and fallout effects while still maintaining the neutron radiation flux. Neutrons are impossible to shield against in iron tanks and, with enough dose, would literally dissolve the brains of the Russian tank crews, leaving crewless tanks to create impossible traffic jams.
The US fielded a multitude of tactical nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Where are they now? No more nuclear depth charges, no more BOMARCs, no more Davy Crockets, no more atomic demolition munitions. We gladly gave them up in our various disarmament treaties with the USSR. Obsolete all, even if still deadly. We kept our bayonets even if we once stopped training for their use.
Nuclear weapon states can still destroy an opponent’s cities if they have the delivery means, but the threat of retaliation deters use. Even the once unstoppable ICBM is now blunted with limited but effective US anti-ballistic missile defense hardware like THAAD, Patriot, and Safeguard on land and AEGIS SM-3 missiles at sea. Meanwhile, Israel has its proven Iron Dome.
Russia has famously threatened the use of its nuclear weapons in the current Ukrainian war. While in one case explicitly mentioning London as a target, the UK keeps at least one “boomer” submarine on station at all times, armed with its own nuclear warheads and missiles, ready to return fire. “Burn London, lose Moscow” is the calculus, the very essence of the mutually assured destruction (MAD) that has made such trades unlikely.
Russia could nuke Kiev or any Ukrainian city it pleases, although it might take more than one warhead due to delivery attrition and low reliability. But, to paraphrase a line from our Vietnam War experience, why destroy the country to conquer it?
On the battlefield in Ukraine, where would the use of nuclear weapons aid in the Russian conquest? From afar, the war looks like WWI trench warfare with drones—another Verdun, as VD Hanson has pointed out. Using nukes against entrenched troops when drones do about the same job more economically is stupid. Plus, drones leave the battlefield site accessible to advancing troops, an iffy proposition with nukes.
Anti-tank weapons like the Javelin fired by up-close infantry have made tanks of limited utility, ending the need for neutron bombs. Air power would be the past answer to trench and tank battles, but the anti-aircraft defenses have kept both Russian and Ukrainian warplanes back from the fighting. Parked aircraft are rather vulnerable to the blast effects of nuclear weapons but the response would be and has been dispersal.
While nuclear weapons are not going away, they won’t be used, at least this time. Just the political costs of breaking the tradition of “no first use since Nagasaki” would work against Russia, even if they had something to gain. While the US has led the planet’s nuclear non-proliferation efforts, Russia has all along largely supported that effort. What would they gain if Poland, Turkey, South Korea, Finland, Kazakhstan, Japan, Taiwan, or Germany decided they needed nuclear weapons? What did they gain when China under Mao got theirs?
Sorry Mr. Putin, but I call your bluff. “Threat or menace?” Maybe both but little more.
The author was rightfully scared of Russian nukes growing up in the Cold War. But now he’s learned to stop worrying and love the bomb.