Although the United States is widely acknowledged as the most powerful military force on earth, we haven’t decisively won a war since the hawkish-sounding Department of War became the peaceful-sounding Department of Defense, way back in 1947.
We’ve never actually lost a war. Frankly we never came very close, not since the successful conclusion of our second and last war with Great Britain.
Still, we managed to “invite” replays of major wars. For instance, When World War I ended with an armistice instead of a decisive victory, it set the stage for World War II. By learning our lessons, it became possible to achieve a better outcome the second time. In addition to World War I, we’ve re-fought several wars, including the First Gulf War.
Today is Yom Kippur and our only real ally in the eastern Mediterranean, Israel, has fought nearly as many wars between 1947 and 2025 as the United States has from 1775 to 2025. In doing so, they’ve learned the difference between a victory and – while not absolute defeat, at least, so far – a non-victory. The United States equivocal commitment is a major factor here.
Take, for instance, Biden’s “unequivocal” support for a “whatever it takes” campaign against Gaza following the devastating Oct. 7, 2023 slaughter of more than 1,200 innocents. Their support from Biden lasted less than three weeks, blowing away like sand in a desert windstorm.
On the other hand, during the Twelve Day War against Iran’s nuclear weapons program, Israel received strong support from a very different American president, Donald Trump. Added to consistent political support for Israel, he also ordered U.S. Navy ships to provide an anti-missile shield over Israel, expending roughly 40 percent of America’s most capable anti-missile missile systems – the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) AAM. These helped protect Israel from Iranian kamikaze drones and long-range ballistic missiles.
Toward the end of that war – one airstrike ended it – seven of America’s B-2A Spirit stealth bombers demolished three extremely deep Iranian bunkers. Each aircraft deployed two of the world’s largest and most effective non-nuclear deep penetrators – GBU-57 30,000-pound bunker-busting bombs. These shattered deeply buried technology critical to the making of Iran’s planned atom bombs.
Once Iran realized the awesome power of these weapons, as well as America’s ability to deploy more of them at will, the war swiftly concluded. The infrastructure and technology required to build atom bombs was set back months – more likely, years – giving Israel necessary breathing space. It also put the world on notice that we have stealth aircraft and maximally destructive non-nuclear bombs, power to make any country reluctant to invite their own GBU-57 beat-down.
Perhaps with our new president and new priorities, we won’t have to use them again. At heart, America’s military strength depends on two things.
First, potential enemies who believe we have weapons for which they have no defense, weapons capable of wreaking incredible havoc on pin-point targets. Next, the world knows America knows how war a win. That’s something the Department of Defense never seemed to learn, but something the Department of War must embrace.
Here is the box score of our wars won and lost, from the American Revolution to our humiliating retreat from Afghanistan.
Department of War closed in favor of Department of Defense
More than two decades after the First Gulf War – at least until President Trump took office – America had yet to really learn that war is all about breaking things and killing people.
We wage war so we and our allies survive, peacefully, regardless of what our enemies might prefer. Defense alone can’t do this. Pre-emptive war is often necessary. Successful wars – World War II, for instance – must be fought to achieve the objective of unconditional surrender. To leave an enemy politically intact and able to rearm and prepare for the next war just invites another war.
When it comes to the importance of military intelligence in fighting a pre-emptive war against sworn enemies is essential. In 1967, Israel knew what the Arab coalition planned. Deterrence achieved via a pro-active attack proved vital to Israel’s survival against a larger, better-armed enemy.
Small and surrounded by Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, deterring Their planned attack had existential consequences.
If America needs a low-cost object lesson about the difference between war fought to victory and the war that peters out, accomplishing nothing beyond the expenditures of warfighters and the weapons they use, Israel can provide that, too. A big part of this lesson – one Israel repeatedly learned again and again – is the importance of using effective military intelligence, both tactical and strategic.
Look at the Twelve Day War against Iran’ nuclear infrastructure. Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, identified a host of targets – political and military leaders, nuclear scientists and deep bunkers. From the start of that brief war, Israel – and, in one deadly airstrike using B-2As carrying the world’s largest non-nuclear bunker-busters, the two allies devastated Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
As a cautionary tale America’s Department of War needs to institutionalize, Israel forgot that warning.
Every time Mossad focuses on external enemies, and Israel acts pre-emptively, they win quickly and decisively. These well-planned wars include the Six Day War in '67 and the Twelve Day War against Iran. Even the pre-emptive counter-terror attack on Hezbollah’s leadership, using beepers and cell phones including small explosive devices, proved decisive. When a call or message came in, that signal triggered the explosive while the device. Reports suggest that 18,000 or more Hezbollah leaders were “decapitated.”
The decisive Six Day War also began with a pre-emptive strike. Mossad pinpointed five Arab nations about to launch their own pre-emptive strike. Israel didn’t wait to be hit. They the Arab coalition first, devastating their air and tank forces, already loaded, fueled and ready to start a war. That’s why the war only lasted six days. Pre-emptive war was all little Israel could to defeat a much larger force, doing so without paying a huge penalty. Striking first, striking as proved decisive. It worked, and that’s not the only time.
Sadly, six years later, Mossad let Israel down. Arab coalition forces attacked first – on a high holy day – when Israel’s military forces were on family or religious holidays. Before they could gather their weapons and fight back, Israel had already come very close to losing.
Taking horrific casualties in the first hours of the Yom Kippur War, Israel’s Air Force – IAF – and its armored forces were nearly destroyed.
If not for Nixon’s support, Israel would have fallen.
After the Six Day War, Egypt received a potentially decisive number of Soviet man-portable anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles. The Soviet weapons’ small warheads didn’t always destroy their targets, but they could disable them. Tanks were often easy to repair, though more recent imports from America needed spare parts, which Nixon airlifted to besieged Israel. However, Israel’s damaged aircraft took longer to repair than they had before catastrophic defeat. What they needed were fresh air-to-ground weapons, carried by planes compatible with IAF aircraft.
Fortunately, since the Six Day War, the U.S. had become supplier of most of Israel's front-line combat planes. These were the same combat aircraft flown by the U.S. Navy in Vietnam – McDonnell F-4 Phantom IIs and Douglas A-4 Skyhawks. In addition, Nixon ordered munitions by the score shipped to Israel in a top-secret strategic airlift called Operation Nickel Grass. Because this was so top-secret, reports that Nixon also ordered US Navy aircraft carriers in the Med or Atlantic to fly deck loads of planes to Israel have yet to be confirmed, though sources suggest this did happen. After a quick paint job, they went right into combat, saving Israel from defeat.
The new War Department needs to learn from Israel’s successes – and their failures. Fortunately, they are indeed our allies again, and the lessons are there to be learned and implemented. The Twelve Day War suggests this is already in place.
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I’m Ned Barnett, a military historian and author. Starting later this year, I’ll be publishing the first in a series of ten novels of air combat in the Pacific from Pearl Harbor through the end of the Guadalcanal campaign. These are currently being professionally edited. Since 1982, I’ve published 41 books, including non-fiction, military history, science fiction & fantasy and – later this year – I’ll be publishing a new science fiction novel about the historically accurate UFO encounter in Kentucky in August, 1955, in Kelly, Kentucky.
When I’m not writing for myself, or for American Thinker, I help other writers and those who’d like to become writers. I do this by ghostwriting books (19 written and published so far), co-writing or coaching developing writers. I also help authors promote, market and sell their books. If you’d like to find out more about becoming a successful book writer, let’s talk. I’m at nedbarnett51@gmail.com or 702-561-1167.